Arbitration and the Federal Balance by King, Alyssa
Indiana Law Journal 
Volume 94 Issue 4 Article 5 
Fall 2019 
Arbitration and the Federal Balance 
Alyssa King 
Queen's University, Faculty of Law, alyssa.king@queensu.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
King, Alyssa (2019) "Arbitration and the Federal Balance," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 94 : Iss. 4 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol94/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law 
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ 
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact 
rvaughan@indiana.edu. 
 
ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL BALANCE 
ALYSSA S. KING* 
 Mandatory arbitration of statutory rights in contracts between parties of unequal 
bargaining power has drawn political attention at both the federal and state level. 
The importance of such reforms has only been heightened by the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of preemption under the FAA and of arbitral authority. This case law 
creates incentives for courts at all levels to prefer expansive readings of an 
arbitration clause. As attempts at federal regulation have stalled, state legislatures 
and regulatory agencies can expect to be subject to renewed focus. If state 
legislatures cannot easily limit arbitrability, an alternative is to try reforms that seek 
to make arbitration more closely resemble judging. Some common reforms that have 
been proposed or adopted at the state level include conflict-of-interest rules for 
arbitrators, default process rules, and publication requirements. These proposals 
might bring arbitration more in line with the processes and outcomes one might 
expect from a state court.  
Reform along these lines is worth pursuing, but faces two significant problems. 
The first is federal preemption. Most prior cases have focused on state law controls 
before an arbitration gets started. State laws implemented during and after 
arbitration may avoid the same fate. A less obvious problem comes from the degree 
certain state reforms aim to treat arbitration as a substitute for court. Arbitrators 
lack the authority that judges have to develop the law, creating a further due process 
problem for parties who expect to be operating in a common law system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it did not always do so, the Supreme Court now treats the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) as preempting nearly any limits state courts can impose before 
granting a motion to compel arbitration. Moreover, the Court has given arbitrators 
significant powers subject to little federal review, including the ability to rule on their 
own jurisdiction in many cases. This expansion in arbitral power has been subject to 
fierce critique. 1  Consumer and employment arbitration have drawn special 
objections as plaintiffs often have little bargaining power and face capacious clauses 
requiring them to arbitrate federal and state statutory rights. 2  In some areas, 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 
1237–38 (2011) [hereinafter Aragaki, Suspect Status] (first of two papers approaching FAA 
preemption from an antidiscrimination perspective); Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for 
Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1193 (2011) [hereinafter Aragaki, Equal Opportunity] 
(second in same series); David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and 
State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2013) (arguing that Congress’s purpose was 
simply to stop state courts that wanted to ban all arbitration); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
931 (1999) (legislative history supports more limited reading of preemption under FAA 
savings clause); Imre S. Szalai, DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used a 
Jedi Mind Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 75, 77 
(2017) (“The Court overrides and alters . . . the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA.”). 
 2. Such cases are typified by plaintiffs who have signed contracts that include 
agreements to arbitrate as a condition of accessing a good or service or of employment. The 
contracts are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & 
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 14–17 (2015), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic [https://perma.cc/6AKN-83C6]; 
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in 
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2893–914 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes]; E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public-
Policy-Based Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal 
Agency Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015) (“Employment arbitration has long 
been a favorite target of these state legislative and judicial efforts [at regulation].”); Advocacy: 
Forced Arbitration, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.nela.org/index.cfm?pg=mandarbitration [https://perma.cc/AJ6Q-NRHJ] 
(cataloguing bills introduced in Congress aimed at curbing employment and consumer 
arbitration); Sonia Gill & Amanda Werner, End Forced Arbitration, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2016, 
5:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/04/end-forced-arbitration-cfpb 
-000110 [https://perma.cc/XDL6-FSF7] (“For more than a quarter century, Big Business has 
engaged in a stealth campaign to block consumers, employees and small businesses harmed 
by corporate lawbreakers from finding justice in a court of law.”).  
Employment issues have become especially salient in the “#MeToo” era. See Judith Resnik, 
A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts 
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arbitration clauses are ubiquitous and unavoidable. Agreements to arbitrate may 
facilitate attempts by private actors to displace state and federal legislation.3 The 
expansion of arbitral authority also threatens a model of regulatory enforcement that 
often uses private litigation in court.4  
Supreme Court majorities also seem to have a specific model of arbitration in 
mind. Although the Court has repeatedly affirmed broad, courtlike powers for 
arbitrators on matters like jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, it has resisted the 
idea that going to arbitration should mirror going to court. 5 In Epic Systems v. Lewis, 
the majority described arbitration as “traditionally individualized and informal [in] 
nature” and asserted that it was that “traditional arbitration process” the FAA meant 
to protect.6 Defenders of the use of arbitration, as well as its critics, can easily find 
something to dislike in this vision of the phenomenon, which is alternately broad and 
narrow. The question is whether they can do anything about it. State law may provide 
an unlikely answer. 
Federal action to alter the status quo seems unlikely in the near to medium term. 
Despite some recent rumblings and carve outs for certain industries, a divided 
Congress is not poised to change the FAA.7 Clashes between the Supreme Court and 
state supreme courts may have helped make the case for agency rulemaking in the 
Obama administration. Those rules have now been rolled back.8 Should a future 
 
 
and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 613 (2018). In February 2018, the attorneys general or 
chief legal officers of every state, territory, and the District of Columbia signed a letter asking 
Congress to ban arbitration of workplace sexual harassment claims. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n 
of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader, 
Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Charles E. Schumer, Senate Minority Leader, 
Kevin McCarthy, House Majority Leader, Steny Hoyer, House Minority Whip, John Cornyn, 
Senate Majority Whip, and Richard J. Durbin, Senate Minority Whip 1, 1–2 (Feb. 12, 2018), 
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/HFIS-AVWMYN/$file/NAAG+letter+to 
+Congress+Sexual+Harassment+Mandatory+Arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WR2 
-E7WQ]. For an overview of the politics of reform proposals see Stephen J. Ware, The Politics 
of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711 (2016). 
 3. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 87–88 (2012); David 
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 437 (2011)). 
 4. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040); Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in 
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326, 339 (2007); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, 
“Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56 (2004); J. Maria Glover, 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3075 (2015). 
 5. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, VAND. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 26–29); Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social 
Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 480 (2010). 
 6. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018). 
 7. See Emily Birnbaum, Google Employees Join Lawmakers Pushing Bills to End 
Forced Arbitration, HILL (Feb. 28, 2019, 2:14 PM) https://thehill.com/policy/technology 
/432065-lawmakers-introduce-bills-to-end-forced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/626W 
-ZXR9]; see also Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33,217–18; Peter B. Rutledge & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 59.  
 8. Jim Puzzanghera, Senate Votes to Kill New Rule Allowing Class-Action Lawsuits 
Against Banks; Pence Casts Deciding Vote, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017, 3:20 PM), 
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administration want to regulate again, the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems 
that the FAA trumped the agency’s interpretation of a statute suggests that agencies 
will need specific statutory authorization to regulate arbitration.9 State courts can do 
little to back up state legislatures by barring arbitration—such decisions are largely 
preempted. Even state judges hostile to arbitration as the Supreme Court conceives 
of it have reasons to endorse broad arbitral authority as allowing arbitrators to make 
more decisions at least deprives the Court of the ability to make more undesirable 
precedent. 
In the face of expanded arbitral powers and limited ability to protect access to 
courts, state legislatures may instead choose to regulate what happens in arbitration 
and what happens afterwards. Some have done so. These regulations are not 
primarily implemented by state courts deciding whether to allow arbitration. State 
courts that try to do so will likely run afoul of the FAA, and many rule violations 
would not be visible until the arbitration has taken place. Instead, arbitrators and 
arbitration organizations are responsible for following the state legislation, with the 
courts stepping in only if arbitrators do not. Existing and proposed state laws address 
conflicts of interest, procedural fairness, and public information about arbitration 
outcomes. Such reforms have in common a model of arbitration as third-party 
adjudication, or as Mark Weidemaier has described it, “judging lite.” 10  This 
adjudication needs the same types of legitimating features—such as adjudicator 
independence or notice and opportunity to be heard—characteristic of court rules.11 
These state reform efforts face two main hurdles. The first is that reforms may be 
preempted by the FAA. The question of whether an arbitrator followed state rules by 
doing things like disclosing conflicts or correctly apportioning fees will likely arise 
after the arbitration is over, with a request to vacate the award. The Court may expand 
FAA preemption to cover state court decisions on vacating awards, despite statutory 
language that would suggest the FAA is more limited. State legislators may be able 
to skirt preemption issues by finding other means of enforcement, but these work-
arounds could still face preemption challenges. Proponents of state rules will face 
the Supreme Court’s tendency to define arbitration against litigation in court. In 
essence, they will be attempting to use the Court’s broad conception of arbitral power 
as a shield against its narrow view of traditional arbitration. State courts cannot refuse 
to allow arbitration that follows certain procedure. Arbitrators might be able to 
implement those same rules, but it is not clear if state courts can vacate their awards 
if arbitrators refuse.  
Even in a best-case scenario in which the reforms are not preempted and most 
arbitrators voluntarily comply, however, a problem would remain. Under existing 
Supreme Court precedent, arbitration is not quite judging, or not just judging, but 




perma.cc/793B-DEGW]; see Lydia Wheeler, Fight Over Right to Sue Nursing Homes Heats 
Up, HILL (Aug. 6, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/regulation/healthcare/345411-fight 
-over-right-to-sue-nursing-homes-heats-up [https://perma.cc/9MMM-EDVD]. 
 9. Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1612. 
 10. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and 
Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2012) (treating arbitrators as akin to judges). 
 11. See Markovits, supra note 5, at 433. 
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rely on prior arbitrations or on public policy in making their decisions because 
arbitrators are agents of the parties designated to resolve a contract dispute.12 Parties 
and arbitrators still must adapt to a situation that does not conform to common law 
expectations. Even if they succeed in putting in place the key elements of 
adjudication in court, state legislatures may fail to make the deep structural changes 
that would be necessary to accommodate a system that does not create common law 
style precedent. 
A trend toward more elaborate procedural rules in response to arbitrators’ 
widening mandates cuts across jurisdictions and types of arbitration.13 It takes on an 
added dimension in the United States because of its implications for federalism.14 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has tied diminished state regulatory authority to 
expanded arbitral jurisdiction.15 With arbitration seemingly here to stay, it is worth 
thinking about ways in which actors at the state level might regulate arbitration and 
ways in which it might be made less hostile to their ends.  
In seeking to control arbitration and arbitrators, state legislators might be 
responding to a wide variety of complaints, only some of which can be adequately 
addressed through this means. A debate exists about the extent and nature of any 
arbitrator bias, and it is hard to resolve when full information about arbitral awards 
is not available.16 In consumer and employment arbitrations, the fear is that repeat 
 
 
 12. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683–85 (2010). 
 13. See Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How 
Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between 
Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J. 381, 393–411 (2018) (tracing history of 
judicialization in U.S. domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and 
international investment arbitration). 
 14. This Article relies on a dynamic approach to federalism. On how such an account 
works in a U.S. context, see ROBERT A SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 95–96 (2009) (arguing that federalism is best 
understood as a dynamic interaction between central and local institutions); Heather K. 
Gerken, Forward: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19–20 (2010) 
(comparing her account of cooperation and conflict between federal, state, and local 
institutions with Schapiro’s view of federalism). These accounts bear considerable similarities 
to pluralist accounts of the European Union. See, e.g., NICO KRISCH, BEYOND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW 69 (2010) (pluralism 
“is based on the heterarchical interplay of these layers according to the rules ultimately set by 
each layer for itself.”). 
 15. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1479 (2008) (arguing that 
federal courts have increasingly determined that initial questions of unconscionability are not 
gateway questions in order to prevent state courts from using unconscionability as a way 
around FAA preemption); Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide 
Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 44–60 (2011) (cataloguing 
ways in which federal courts have delegated questions of whether a contract is unconscionable 
to the arbitrator). 
 16. Recent work by David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher suggests that repeat 
players are advantaged in consumer and employment arbitration. David Horton & Andrea 
Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 
GEO. L.J. 57, 116 (2015) [hereinafter Horton & Chandraseker, Consumer]; David Horton & 
Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. 
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player defendants will select a favorite arbitrator. State legislation can require 
disclosure of this relationship, giving plaintiffs the information to raise concerns 
about bias. A New York proposal would have taken the further step of banning 
partisan arbitrators, something some providers do already.17  Other proposals are 
 
 
REV. 457, 462 (2016) [hereinafter Horton & Chandraseker, Employment]. A repeat player 
effect suggests that arbitration, like litigation, favors those familiar with the system. If arbitral 
processes are routinized in large organizations, one would expect to see this effect to some 
extent. A repeat-pairing effect, in which certain defendants routinely do better in front of 
certain individual arbitrators, would be more troubling as it would suggest that arbitrators 
might be changing their rulings in order to get repeat business. Some earlier studies reported 
such an effect. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 213 (1997); Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 
(2011). However, Horton and Chandrasekher’s work suggests that this effect vanishes when 
one distinguishes the frequency of “repeat play” by defendants. Repeat pairings happen more 
frequently with what Horton and Chandrasekher call “super repeat players.” What others saw 
as a repeat-pairing effect is an artifact of the super repeat player effect. When one looks 
specifically at groups of super repeat players, medium repeat players, and infrequent repeat 
players, no repeat-pairing effect is present. Horton & Chandraseker, Consumer, supra, at 121; 
Horton & Chandrasekher, Employment, supra, at 487. 
Christopher Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz did not find evidence of bias in favor of the 
contract drafter in debt collection arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA). In those arbitrations, the drafter was the plaintiff-creditor. The authors 
found that arbitration was “associated with a decreased likelihood of a creditor win” when 
compared with debt collections in Oklahoma and Virginia state courts and in federal student 
loan cases. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and 
in Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 100 (2011). As the authors acknowledge, cases brought in 
arbitration and in state or federal court may differ in important ways, and the practices of one 
arbitration provider are not necessarily comparable to another. Id. at 82–83. Still, their findings 
are a useful corrective to the expectation that contract drafters will always prefer arbitration 
and tend to win there. In some debt collection cases, getting a default court judgment may be 
easier. 
 17. Assemb. 10393, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7504 (N.Y. 2018); COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R–18(a) (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2013) 
[hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files 
/CommercialRules_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/49HR-FEH6]; CONSTR. INDUSTRY 
ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R–20(a) (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2015) 
[hereinafter AAA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites 
/default/files/Construction%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JEZ-8YRY]; CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION RULES R–19(a) (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2014) [hereinafter AAA CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9S8G-BR67]; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R–
16(a) (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2009) [hereinafter AAA EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES],  
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JNB4-QNCV]; ADMIN. ARBITRATION RULES Rule 7.1 (INT’L INST. FOR 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION & PREVENTION (CPR) 2013), https://www.cpradr.org/resource 
-center/rules/arbitration/administered-arbitration-rules [https://perma.cc/EF3E-7XZ8]; JAMS 
COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES Rule 7 (JAMS 2014), 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive 
_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE4P-2YK4]. 
2019] ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL BALANCE  1453 
 
aimed at procedural fairness, notably including limits on how much a plaintiff will 
have to pay.  
The state laws described here are not a panacea. Proposals aimed at arbitrators or 
arbitration providers only improve matters if arbitrations take place. The question of 
whether they take place has been a matter of some controversy.18 Contract drafters, 
typically defendants, write the rules,19 although arbitration providers may limit their 
ability to impose them.20 The state rules discussed here only help those who attempt 
to arbitrate and are aware, or have lawyers who are aware, of their state rights.  
Further, scholars have raised the specter of substantive law being swallowed up 
by arbitration.21 Arbitrators are asked not only to determine the terms of the parties’ 
contract, but also to apply mandatory state and federal law. With incomplete 
information from parties and arbitration providers, scholars, advocates, and 
politicians do not have a clear sense of how closely arbitrators follow the law. Some 
 
 
 18. For instance, data collected by the Times suggested that few people use arbitration or 
small claims court. Jessica Silver-Greenbert & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015 
/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https:// 
perma.cc/P3QA-BR5W]. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found evidence of this 
approach in the arbitration clauses of financial institutions. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) §§ 2.3, 5.5 (2015). Chandrasekher and 
Horton have made the case the picture is more nuanced. The pair studied consumer, 
employment, and medical malpractice claims in several major arbitration fora. They found 
that plaintiffs do have problems of access, but that in some instances plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
successfully filling large numbers of connected claims. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David 
Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9, 53–55 (2019).  
 19. See IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS 
IN AMERICA 197–98 (2013). 
 20. See AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 17, R–18; AAA EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 17,  R–20–21; JAMS POLICY 
ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES MINIMUM 
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3 (JAMS 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com 
/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-2009.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6HUC-WWWP]; JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM 
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3 (JAMS 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com 
/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3XH-3VH4]. However, market forces limit what providers can do. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow describes how the plaintiff’s side employment bar threatened to boycott arbitration 
organizations over the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 
Although the employees’ lawyers won some additional procedural protections in arbitration, 
they were unable to get employers to stop requiring arbitrations or to get the AAA, the largest 
administrator of employment arbitrations, to stop administering them. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players 
in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 41–42 (1999). 
 21.  Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 409–11 (imagining an end to the development of doctrine as whole 
areas of law become the domain of arbitrators); Glover, supra note 4, at 3075; Kathryn A. 
Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 807 
(2009). 
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states have sought to gather information on arbitration outcomes, which would leave 
legislators in a better position to respond to de facto legal changes worked by 
arbitration. Information rules can respond to some of these concerns, but legislatures 
cannot create a body of precedent out of arbitrated cases even if they wanted to. 
State legislatures can do significantly more to regulate the conduct of arbitration 
and increase transparency. However, legislatures will also have to accommodate 
adjudicators with less power to shape the law than common law courts. Part I of this 
Article explains why state legislatures might want to regulate what happens in 
arbitration—because arbitrators wield significant power and attempts to prevent 
arbitration are likely to be preempted. Part II describes proposed and existing state 
legislation aimed at controlling arbitral processes and outcomes. This Part does not 
address certain avenues, such as private attorney general suits or limits on an 
employer’s ability to require arbitration, that are aimed at keeping certain matters in 
state court, rather than turning arbitration into something that resembles court.22 Part 
III argues that these reforms may have a better chance of surviving Supreme Court 
review than an approach that focuses on barring certain arbitrations. Unlike rules that 
bar access to arbitration, these state rules would be implemented in the first instance 
by arbitrators and in the second instance by a court reviewing the arbitral award. 
Even if the reforms work perfectly, however, Part IV argues that a due process 
problem may remain. U.S. domestic arbitration requires argument and offers 
decisions in a format that may not match the parties’ expectations, making it difficult 
for them to argue their cases effectively. 
I. JURISDICTION STRIPPING THROUGH ARBITRATION AND THE PROBLEM FOR STATE 
LAW 
State courts have limited ability to enact arbitration bans or impose limits on 
arbitration process before allowing an arbitration to go forward. Indeed, state judges 
who disagree with the Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration have incentives to do 
the opposite, handing more decisions to arbitrators to avoid seeing their decisions 
overturned and more negative federal precedent created. These pressures are likely 
to create a situation in which many issues of importance to the enforcement of state 
laws are arbitrated. State legislatures then have a strong interest in regulating 
arbitration process and outcomes so as to exert some control over how the law is 
applied.  
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has paired expanded competence for 
arbitrators under federal law with reduced competence for state judges. This 
 
 
 22. For work on private attorney generals, see Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: 
Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
1203 (2013) (explaining how California courts had determined that parties acting under the 
state’s Private Attorney Generals Act could not be required to arbitrate and that the Supreme 
Court has so far declined to rule on whether this approach violates the FAA). At least three 
states, Kentucky, Maryland, and New York, have laws preventing employers from making 
agreements to arbitrate certain matters a condition of employment. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
336.700 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2018); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 
(LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (MCKINNEY Supp. 2019). As discussed 
in Section I.A, these laws may be preempted. 
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expansion has proceeded along several fronts. Most obviously, the Court’s approach 
to preemption under section 2 of the FAA has limited the ability of state courts to 
enforce arbitration bans either based on subject matter or based on the courts’ 
assessment that certain terms render an arbitration clause automatically 
unconscionable. More subtly, the Court’s understanding of arbitrator authority in its 
treatment of competence-competence and separability has led to reduced space for 
state courts to decide initial gateway issues as it has empowered arbitrators to do so 
instead.  
At the same time, state courts may also find it congenial to empower arbitrators. 
State courts face a situation in which even indirect confrontation with the Supreme 
Court has resulted in ever-wider federal preemption claims. Yet some state 
legislatures have continued to pass laws suggesting that they want the courts to 
control the use of arbitration. 23  State judges who want to avoid continued 
confrontation, and avoid overruling the state legislature’s choices, have the option of 
shifting decision-making from themselves to the arbitrators. This approach is the 
mirror image of the Supreme Court’s own choices to expand arbitrator jurisdiction 
to avoid undesirable state law.  
A. Section 2 and FAA Preemption 
Under section 2 of the FAA, the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed the 
scope of state court jurisdiction and expanded that of arbitrators. Section 2 states that 
an agreement to arbitrate: “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”24 The 
section applies to state court decisions about whether to grant a motion to compel 
arbitration. 
The Court’s current approach to this provision rests on the 1984 case Southland 
Corporation v. Keating, which invalidated the California Supreme Court’s 
determination that claims under the state’s Franchise Investment Law were not 
arbitrable.25 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger argued that Congress used 
the FAA to enact a “national policy favoring arbitration” under the Commerce 
Clause.26 Over a decade later, states continued to contest this outcome, buoyed by 
negative academic reaction to Southland.27 However, the Supreme Court upheld 
Southland in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dodson, striking down a state 
court’s refusal to compel arbitration because the defendant had not complied with a 
state law requiring notice that its contract contained an arbitration clause.28 The Court 
also determined that state laws that create even small barriers to arbitration could 
violate section 2 of the FAA.29 
 
 
 23. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 789 (2001). 
 24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 25. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 10. 
 27. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 84. 
 28. 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). 
 29. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (striking down a 
state court’s refusal to compel arbitration because the defendant had not complied with a state 
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Unconscionability is a state law ground for decision, which should provide 
insulation from Supreme Court review. State courts relying on the argument that a 
given agreement is unconscionable might thus hope to sidestep the preemption 
issue.30 The problem with this approach comes from the doctrine of separability. The 
issue of whether some part of a contract is unconscionable belongs to the arbitrators 
unless the alleged unconscionability is in the arbitration clause itself. By definition, 
many decisions will turn on some characteristic of the agreement to arbitrate that 
itself is unconscionable. Anything that would make an agreement to arbitrate 
unconscionable is likely to be a problem specific to arbitration, the kind of reason a 
state court may not rely on in turning down a motion to compel arbitration.31 With 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court signaled that applying state rules 
of unconscionability was not a way to avoid review.32 
The decision abrogated a California rule, found in both statute and common law, 
barring class action waivers if they would prevent consumers from pursing their 
claims.33 The Court held that the FAA preempted applications of general contract 
rules that had particular effects on arbitration, here allowing the court to declare an 
agreement to arbitrate unconscionable because it barred class arbitration.34 State 
courts could not “discriminate” against arbitration by placing extra conditions on 
agreements to arbitrate. 35  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that 
California’s requirement that a class mechanism be available, whether in court or 
 
 
law requiring notice that its contract contained an arbitration clause). 
 30. See Bruhl, supra note 15, at 1442–43. Marmet Health Care v. Brown exemplifies the 
merger of unconscionability with arguments that directly attack Supreme Court doctrine. In 
rejecting a motion to compel arbitration, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
ultimately relied on the claim that the contract was unconscionable under state law, but its 
opinion reads as if it was building up to a direct attack on the Supreme Court’s view of the 
FAA. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 292–95 (W. Va. 
2011), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 
530 (2012). First the state court argued that certain contracts, such as a contract to enter a 
nursing home, should be accompanied by enhanced protections for consumers. Id. at 269–71. 
The state court then indicated fundamental disagreement with Supreme Court case law, 
insisting that the FAA was a procedural statute and attacking the doctrine of separability as a 
doctrine that forced state courts to enforce illegal contracts. Id. at 278–79. A state court’s use 
of unconscionability also has particular rhetorical bite. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle 
on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
609, 628 (2009) (“By invoking the rhetoric of unconscionability, these judges are not merely 
acting tactically in a game of legal chess . . . they are sending a message, not just to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but to the other officials and institutions that collectively make up our legal 
system.”). 
 31. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A state-law principle that takes its 
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport” with 
section 2 of the FAA.). 
 32. See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 394 (2012). 
 33. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011). 
 34. Id. at 341–42. 
 35. Aragaki, Suspect Status, supra note 1, at 1237. Hiro Aragaki argues that the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence should be seen as enacting an antidiscrimination rule under which 
even reasonable state regulation of arbitration is suspect due to historical biases against 
allowing it. Id. at 1263. 
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arbitration, “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”36 Because class 
mechanisms so fundamentally altered arbitration, requiring class arbitration as a 
condition of granting a motion to compel arbitration was changing the contract’s 
terms. 
Concepcion removed state court control, but left arbitrators’ powers intact. Justice 
Scalia noted that the majority “[found] it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress 
meant to leave the disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator.”37 
However, Concepcion did not resolve the substantive issue of whether and when 
class arbitration was allowed. The Court held that a state court could not require 
access to class arbitration as a condition of granting a motion to compel arbitration.38 
As a result, the majority did not need to engage with the reasons the California courts 
and the state legislature had judged class arbitration to be an important process 
protection. Two years later, a unanimous Court declined to vacate an award in which 
the arbitrators, rather than a judge, had ordered class arbitration.39 
Concepcion involved a federal application of state law.40 Nonetheless, Justice 
Scalia’s opinion focused squarely on state courts, presenting their use of 
unconscionability as a thinly veiled attack on its pro-arbitration precedents and on its 
own supremacy. The opinion imagined the many ways in which a state court might 
use the doctrine of unconscionability to place onerous conditions on arbitration, such 
as requiring full, court-monitored discovery or the use of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 41  Justice Scalia then cited evidence that state courts were using the 
doctrine of unconscionability to thwart national policy favoring arbitration.42  
California was not the only state that saw legislation on arbitration struck down 
when that legislation gave state courts power to reject arbitration clauses as 
unconscionable. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected an arbitration 
clause on the basis that requiring nursing home patients to arbitrate was 
unconscionable under the West Virginia Nursing Home Act.43 The Supreme Court 
issued a brief per curiam opinion rejecting this approach as “incorrect and 
inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of this Court.”44  
The most recent preemption decisions evince suspicion toward the state courts’ 
reasons for refusing to compel arbitration. The majority opinions in DirecTV v. 
 
 
 36. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
 37. Id. at 349. 
 38. Id. at 351. 
 39. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013). 
 40. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337–38. The federal courts may have mangled the 
application of state law because the contract in question allowed for individual arbitration that 
was relatively easy to access. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy 
Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1124 (2011); Suzanna Sherry, Hogs 
Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (contending that “the ATTM 
clause was almost certainly not exculpatory, and therefore should not have been found 
unconscionable”). 
 41. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342. 
 42. Id. at 342–43. 
 43. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 292–95 (W. Va. 2011), cert. 
granted, vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012). 
 44. Marmet Health Care Ctr., 565 U.S. at 532. 
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Imburgia and Kindred Nursing Centers, both cases in which state courts refused to 
compel arbitration, contain suggestions that the state judges involved were less than 
candid in their claims that they are not singling out arbitration.45 Such suspicion may 
lead the Court to apply Concepcion broadly rather than narrowly, leaving less room 
for state courts and applications of state law than would otherwise be the case. 
In DirecTV, a California appellate court read the relevant contract as directing it 
to apply a state statute requiring class arbitration. The majority refused to accept the 
state court’s holding on the content of state contract law 46  and instead saw a 
challenge to the federal Supreme Court’s authority. 47  Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion lectured the state court on the “elementary point of law”—that lower courts 
are bound by Supreme Court decisions.48  
The Kindred majority also accused the state court of having an anti-arbitration 
agenda. There, the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that the general language in 
the powers of attorney did not allow the attorney-in-fact to enter into arbitration 
agreements. 49  Giving up rights to jury trial would require a specific provision 
because of the special nature of the right to a jury as enshrined in the state 
constitution.50 The state court might have been swayed by the context of the case—
wrongful death suits against a nursing home.51 
Justice Kagan dismissed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s view with a touch of 
sarcasm. Among the dubious claims of the Kentucky Supreme Court, she quoted its 
assertion that the framers of the state constitution treated the jury trial right “‘and that 
right alone as a divine God-given right.’”52 Such a rule was “too tailor-made” for 
arbitration.53 The other examples of contracts the court offered were the equivalent 
of making a rule “applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans.”54  
DirecTV and Kindred might be exceptional. DirecTV was another salvo in the 
long fight between the California courts and legislature and the Supreme Court over 
class arbitration. The Kindred court’s praise of the jury trial not only issued a 
challenge to the Supreme Court, but also seems disconnected from the strong 
likelihood that such a case would settle. However, both cases showed majorities on 
the Court suspicious of state court motives and committed to defending the status 
quo of broad FAA preemption. Moreover, the majority opinions leave unclear how 
a state court would demonstrate its sincerity in a decision refusing to compel 
arbitration. These recent cases suggest that dialogue between the state high courts 
and the Supreme Court is unlikely to change the Justices’ minds.  
 
 
 45. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1425–26 (2017); 
DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466–67 (2015). 
 46. DirecTV, 136 S. Ct. at 473 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 467–68. 
 48. Id. at 468. 
 49. Kindred, 137 S. Ct. at 1423. 
 50. Id. at 1424. 
 51. Id. at 1423. 
 52. Id. at 1427 (quoting Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 328–29 
(Ky. 2015)). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1428. 
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The specifics of an individual agreement to arbitrate may still render it 
unconscionable.55 The Brown court in West Virginia took this route on remand. It 
defended the “common law factors” it set out for determining unconscionability as 
sound and undisturbed by the Supreme Court ruling, before remanding to allow 
lower courts to develop evidence of unconscionability in the individual cases.56 The 
Court has declined to disturb state court rulings that agreements to arbitrate lacking 
mutuality of obligation may be unconscionable.57 The Court also left alone a New 
Jersey decision rejecting arbitration when the contract did not indicate that arbitration 
meant waiving rights to court58 and a North Carolina ruling rejecting a poorly drafted 
clause signed that the drafter had a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff.59 Still, 
Concepcion makes it difficult to conceive of how unconscionability might be used 
to regulate the conduct of an arbitration. 60  Any rule specific to the process of 
arbitration would likely relate to questions only arising in the context of arbitration—
which is not the case with mutuality of obligation.  
State judges might explore other elements of state contract law, such as rules 
against contracts made under duress.61 In some cases they have also found reason to 
limit the scope of an arbitration agreement, but these cases are highly fact-specific.62  
 
 
 55. For instance, the California courts consider whether a given arbitration clause 
preserves the parties’ access to “specific protections in order to mitigate the risks and costs of 
pursuing certain types of claims.” If it does not, this factor weighs against it in an 
unconscionability analysis. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 207–08 (Cal. 
2013); see also James Dawson, Comment, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the 
State Courts, 124 YALE L.J. 233, 237 (2014). Susan Landrum notes that state appellate courts 
were more likely to remand unconscionability claims having to do with arbitration rather than 
reject them outright. This result is consistent with state courts treating the unconscionability 
of an arbitration clause as a fact-specific inquiry. Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: 
What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to 
Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 780, 795 (2014).  
 56. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 226–31 (W. Va. 2012). 
 57. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Mo. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 
822 (2012); Figueroa v. THI of New Mexico at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 491 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1004 (2013). 
 58. Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 313–16 (N.J. 2014) (detailing 
New Jersey law requirements for valid waiver across a number of different contexts and 
concluding that they were not met in the specific case), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2804 (2015). 
 59. King v. Bryant, 795 S.E.2d 340, 344–45, 350–52 (N.C. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
314 (2017). 
 60. The California Supreme Court agreed, writing that “Concepcion holds that even if a 
class waiver is exculpatory in a particular case, it is nonetheless preempted by the FAA.” 
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L. A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 136 (Cal. 2014). 
 61. Dawson, supra note 55, at 244–46. 
 62. See, e.g., Stephan v. Millennium Nursing & Rehab Ctr., Inc., No. 1170524, 2018 WL 
4846501, at *13 (Ala. Oct. 5, 2018) (declining to enforce arbitration clause signed by relative 
who did not have power of attorney for patient with dementia); Keyes v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 
240 So. 3d 373, 373 (Miss. 2018) (discussing some tort claims, including false imprisonment 
and malicious prosecution, outside the scope of claims contemplated by agreement to arbitrate 
claims “arising out of” “employment” or “termination of employment”); Doe v. Hallmark 
Partners, LP, 277 So. 3d 1052, 1057 (Miss. 2017) (concluding that claims related to failure to 
stop a rape were not within scope of rental complex arbitration clause). 
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Should it be taken up widely, the doctrine of duress is unlikely to fare any better than 
unconscionability. Any general rules that courts use routinely to declare arbitration 
clauses are signed under duress are likely to be rules specific to arbitration.  
State legislatures are in a bind. They cannot simply tell state courts not to enforce 
contracts to arbitrate. Limits on the parties’ ability to contract for arbitration, such as 
an employer’s ability to require consent to arbitration as a condition of employment, 
may face a similar preemption problem. Some states have attempted to pass such 
provisions, but in others preemption concerns seem to be winning out.63 
With dialogue with the Supreme Court unlikely, and few tools for general rulings 
on arbitration, state courts are not in the best institutional position to challenge FAA 
preemption. State legislatures cannot simply give them more power to prevent abuses 
of the arbitration process. 
B. Arbitrability 
To understand the full impact of the Court’s FAA section 2 jurisprudence, one 
must pair it with the Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence. The Court has expanded the 
subject matter of arbitration, allowing arbitrators to interpret statutes and insisting 
that doing so does not compromise statutory rights. 64 It has also increased the ability 
of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction. American arbitrators do not 
automatically have the authority to decide arbitrability. Issues go to arbitration if 
there is “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that the parties meant to arbitrate them 
instead of asking a court to decide.65 However, this rule should be read in light of the 
 
 
 63. In the wake of #MeToo scandals, New York and Maryland passed statutes that prevent 
employers from requiring employees to arbitrate sexual harassment claims. MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (LexisNexis 2016 & Supp. 2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 
Supp. 2018); PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMP’T, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
(US) (2019), Westlaw w-015-2380. Kentucky had a law prohibiting an employer from making 
agreement to arbitrate a condition of employment. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.700 
(LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2018). The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld it, arguing that doing 
so did not “single out arbitration” because the law merely prevented employers from requiring 
any sort of waiver of the employee’s rights. N. Ky. Area Dev. Dist. v. Snyder, No. 2017-SC-
000277-DG, 2018 WL 4628143, at *4–5 (Ky. Sept. 27, 2018). However, the legislature 
recently amended the law to allow employers to require arbitration. S.B. 720, engrossed, 2019 
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); Henry Allen Blair, Kentucky Legislature Reaffirms the Right of 




=0_3c40c240d0-7ce817b7c8-73366081 [https://perma.cc/2L3W-HZJ3]. A bill that would 
have had an effect similar to Kentucky’s—preventing employers from requiring consent to 
arbitration as a condition of employment, passed the state legislature, but was vetoed. Assemb. 
B. 3080, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 64. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637. 
 65. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 (1995) (alterations in 
original). In describing these issues, the Court used the term “arbitrability,” which authors use 
a in number of ways. George A. Bermann, The “Gateway Problem” in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2012). If the issue is whether the claim 
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doctrines of competence-competence and separability. These doctrines give 
arbitrators broad power to determine arbitrability.  
Sending matters to be arbitrated can reduce federal-state conflict by reducing 
either set of courts’ ability to decide an issue, routinely handing it to arbitrators for 
resolution. Doctrines that expand arbitrability might thus be attractive to state judges 
wary of clashing with federal ones or who wish to allow arbitral decisions that differ 
from the Supreme Court’s desired outcome. 
1. Expansion by the Supreme Court 
Under the doctrine of competence-competence, the arbitrator can decide on the 
extent of her own jurisdiction unless the arbitration clause says otherwise.66 The 
doctrine of separability holds that “any contract that contains an arbitration clause is, 
in fact, two contracts: (1) a contract to arbitrate disputes and (2) the overarching 
container contract.”67 The doctrine allows an arbitral tribunal to declare a contract 
invalid or unenforceable without “destroying the basis of its authority to make that 
very ruling.”68 Since the agreement to arbitrate is a separate agreement, it can provide 
a basis for arbitral authority even if the main contract fails.69 This proposition is 
relatively uncontroversial, but its application to decisions about arbitrability is more 
fraught.70 The Court relied on the doctrine of separability to allow courts to hear 
challenges to the existence of a contract71 and challenges that go to the validity of the 
arbitration clause, but not challenges that go to the validity of “the contract as a 
whole.”72 
The Court has further separated delegation clauses, which give arbitrators the 
power to determine the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, from the rest of the 
arbitration clause. If a contract contains a delegation clause, challenges in court must 
be only to that delegation clause and not to the arbitration in general.73 Thus, the 
Court determined that the plaintiff’s challenges to the arbitration agreement’s fee-
splitting arrangement and limitations on discovery were challenges to the arbitration 
agreement, but not to the delegation agreement, and should be before an arbitrator.74 
Delegation clauses are relatively common in consumer and employment contracts.75 
 
 
can be decided in arbitration as a matter of statutory or common law, rather than contract, the 
issue belongs in court. Id. at 29. If the issue is what the contract lets arbitrators decide, the 
doctrine is less clear. Id. 
 66. Bermann, supra note 65, at 13–14; see Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 
63, 72 (2010). 
 67. Horton, supra note 3, at 449. 
 68. Bermann, supra note 65, at 22. 
 69. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406–07 (1967). 
 70. See Bermann, supra note 65, at 22. 
 71. Id. at 31 (noting that, in Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
561 U.S. 287 (2010), the Court treated the existence of the main contract as a matter for a court 
to decide prior to allowing arbitration). 
 72. Id. at 23. 
 73. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010). 
 74. Id. at 73–74. 
 75. Horton, supra note 3, at 491. 
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Moreover, nearly all circuits to decide the issue have held that reference to specific 
provider rules that contain a delegation clause, such as the rules of frequently used 
providers like JAMS and AAA, demonstrates the parties’ intent to let the arbitrator 
decide arbitrability.76 Before the Court’s intervention, some state courts had rejected 
allowing the arbitrator to decide arbitrability in this way, reasoning that arbitrators 
have a financial interest in finding that a matter is arbitrable.77 The Court rejected 
this approach, assuming parity between arbitration and litigation.78 
The Court finally seems to have found the limits of this approach in New Prime 
Inc. v. Oliveira.79 New Prime, which drafted the delegation clause at issue in the case, 
specified arbitration according to AAA rules, under which arbitrators may rule on 
questions of arbitrability. 80  New Prime argued that this clause meant that the 
arbitrator, not a court, should decide if Oliveira was an employee within the meaning 
of section 1 of the FAA.81 If Oliveira was an employee within the meaning of section 
1, the statute would bar arbitration.82 The Court rejected this invitation to have the 
arbitrator determine the statutory limits of his or her authority.83 Instead, New Prime 
holds that the statutory interpretation question must be decided in court.84 Around 
the same time, however, the Court issued its decision in Henry Schein v. Archer & 
White, rejecting the doctrine under which some courts rejected motions to compel 




 76. Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile U.S., Inc., 877 F.3d 522, 527–28 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(collecting cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and 
Federal Circuits); Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272, 1284 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(announcing that, contrary to the view of some commentators the circuit does not “deviate[] 
from this consensus”). The Fourth Circuit limited its holding to sophisticated commercial 
parties. Simply Wireless, Inc., 877 F.3d at 528. Other circuits have allowed provider rules as 
evidence of delegation even when one party was unsophisticated. Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 
559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 
(1st Cir. 2009). But see Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 
(3d. Cir. 2016) (rejecting this approach and determining that reference to AAA rules does not 
delegate all questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators). Some courts also treat adhesive 
contracts differently. David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 
414–16 (2018). 
 77. David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-
Making, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 19). 
 78. Id. at 20–21. 
 79. 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). 
 80. Id. at 536–37 
 81. Id. at 538. 
 82. Id. at 539. 
 83. Id. at 538. 
 84. Id. at 544; Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious About Enforcing 
Arbitration Agreements for Transportation Workers, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2018, 6:26 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-about-enforcing 
-arbitration-agreements-for-transportation-workers [https://perma.cc/88CZ-9P82]. 
 85. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019). Henry 
Schein left open the question of whether the delegation clause at issue, which was found in 
AAA rules rather than the contract, would delegate the matter to the arbitrator. Id. at 531. See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor George A. Bermann in Support of Respondent at 7, Henry 
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The distinction between challenges to the contract, the arbitration clause, and the 
delegation clause is “logically dubious.”86 For every situation in which line drawing 
is relatively easy—between an argument that an employment contract is 
unconscionable because of the fee-splitting arrangement versus an argument that it 
offers the employee an unconscionably low wage, for instance—there are other 
situations in which line drawing is hard, as with the claim the contract suffers from 
fraud in the inducement.87 The Court’s approach makes more sense when read from 
a policy perspective as an effort to move more cases into arbitration. 
2. Expansion by State Courts 
State courts face a situation in which even indirect confrontation with the Supreme 
Court has resulted in ever-wider federal preemption claims. Yet some state 
legislatures have continued to pass laws suggesting that they want the courts to 
control the use of arbitration. 88  State judges who want to avoid continued 
confrontation, and avoid overruling the state legislature’s choices, might also find it 
convenient to shift decision-making from themselves to the arbitrators. This 
approach is the mirror image of the Supreme Court’s own choices to expand 
arbitrator jurisdiction.  
State courts may not set out to engage in strategic judging, but some observers 
have seen evidence of it in relation to arbitration.89 The Supreme Court’s harsh 
response to recent unconscionability decisions also suggests that at least some 
justices suspect some state courts of trying to enforce a view of arbitration that differs 
from the Court’s. Arbitrators given broad, judicial powers may also have a different 
view of what such powers entail than the Supreme Court does. The dual nature of 
arbitrators’ mandate in federal arbitration law makes it possible for arbitrators’ views 
to prevail. Like judges, they may be masters of their own competence. However, if 
an arbitrator’s decision on this issue is subject to review only as a contract term, then 
federal courts cannot do much about a decision they disagree with. As result, state 
courts may have incentives to take arbitrability even further than the Supreme Court 
has. 
Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive offers one example of how an expansive approach 
by a state court might create space for arbitrators to act. In Sandquist, the California 
Supreme Court confronted a discrimination claim for hostile work environment in 
which the employee had signed a contract with an arbitration clause.90 The trial court 
sent the matter to arbitration, but believed that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions 
required it to rule on whether class arbitration was available and to rule that it was 
not.91 The appellate court sent this question to the arbitrator, and the California 
Supreme Court affirmed.92  
 
 
Shein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). 
 86. Bermann, supra note 65, at 23; see also Horton, supra note 76, at 424.  
 87. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70–71 (2010). 
 88. Cole, supra note 23, at 789. 
 89. Bruhl, supra note 15, at 1434–37. 
 90. Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 510 (Cal. 2016). 
 91. Id. at 511. 
 92. Id. 
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During his employment, the employee signed several arbitration agreements, all 
with language requiring that “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy” be arbitrated.93 
The court found that such language easily included the issue of whether class 
mechanisms were allowed.94 The arbitration clause also invoked the FAA, requiring 
the California court to interpret federal law. Determining that no prior precedents 
controlled, the court then asked whether the availability of class was something the 
parties had agreed to arbitrate.95 Under state contract law, the court ruled that the 
parties had agreed to arbitrate the matter and the FAA presented no obstacle.96 In 
doing so, it explicitly likened arbitrators to judges: “We may not presume 
categorically that arbitrators are ill-equipped to disregard . . . institutional incentives 
and rule fairly and equitably; the FAA requires that we treat arbitration as a coequal 
forum for dispute resolution.”97  
Some elements of Sandquist might have drawn U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny. 
Sandquist interpreted the FAA in a provocative manner. The California court refused 
to apply Concepcion’s dicta arguing in favor of courts deciding whether an 
arbitration clause allows for class procedures.98 Instead of agreeing that the FAA 
require courts to decide on the availability of class as a gateway matter, the California 
Supreme Court held that the FAA was silent. Although its decision ultimately relied 
on state law, the court carefully explained why it did not accept a line of federal cases 
holding that the FAA requires courts to decide the issue of whether class arbitration 
is allowed.99  
The California court’s decision leaves space for arbitrators to pursue an approach 
to arbitral procedure at odds with the vision of arbitration that the Court seems to 
adopt in cases like Epic Systems. FAA preemption cases often center around state 
courts’ ability to limit or mandate procedures and to decide which legal claims could 
be arbitrated. One of the biggest problems in this area has been the one raised in 
Sandquist—the use of arbitration clauses in combination with class action waivers. 
Plaintiffs in very low value cases tend not to pursue individual arbitration.100 Costs 
may outweigh the value of any relief to which they are entitled.101 Pursuing a case 
on an individual basis takes time that many people do not have. It also requires the 
potential plaintiff to recognize that he or she has a claim to pursue.  
 
 
 93. Id. at 512. The agreement had a few exceptions not relevant to an employment 
discrimination claim. Id. at 513. 
 94. Id. at 514. 
 95. Id. at 516. 
 96. Id. at 514, 516–18. 
 97. Id. at 522. 
 98. Id. at 519–20; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–50 (2011). 
 99. Sandquist, 376 P.3d at 519–20. 
 100. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2893–94. One telecommunications 
provider, AT&T, designates AAA to administer consumer arbitrations. When Judith Resnik 
set out to identify filings against the company, she found that consumers filed only about 
twenty-seven claims per year. Id. at 2894. It is possible that AT&T is settling a huge mass of 
claims through its internal customer service process. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as 
Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 559–60 (2016). 
 101. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 
69, 83 (2007). 
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California courts ordering class proceedings directly would run into trouble. In 
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court decision ordering 
class arbitration based on California state law.102 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
stating that “[c]ourts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that parties have 
consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis.”103 The FAA preempted any state law to 
the contrary.104 Arbitrators face fewer constraints. The Court upheld an arbitration 
tribunal’s decision allowing class arbitration in Oxford Health despite its evident 
disagreement with the tribunal’s reasoning.105 Before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Epic Systems, a district court even upheld an arbitrator’s decision to interpret the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as instructing him to ignore a class waiver in 
a contract and allow class arbitration.106 Still, the case underscores just how far 
arbitrators may go in asserting their power under mandatory rules of law and how 
little they may see themselves as beholden to the words of the contract. 
Although the Sandquist court may not have known it, its decision is likely to 
substantially increase the chances that California plaintiffs have access to class 
arbitration. Recent empirical work demonstrates that arbitrators are far more likely 
to order class arbitration than are federal courts faced with similar contractual 
language. State court decisions and state statutes favorable to collective litigation 
seem to factor into arbitrators’ decisions on whether to allow class arbitration.107 
Ironically, a maximalist approach to delegation clauses could enable arbitrators to 
determine that certain contract terms, such as reductions to statutes of limitations or 
limits on punitive damages, cannot be applied. Class arbitration is the rare case in 
which some state courts and legislatures have sought to expand arbitral power 
beyond what the Court favors. In situations in which state legislation or precedent 
places limits on arbitrators, arbitrators may quickly declare it preempted by the FAA. 
Yet matters are not so simple. Some types of arbitration routinely involve elements 
the Court has not viewed as characteristic of arbitration, such as public, reasoned 
decisions.108 Certain arbitrators and arbitration organizations also have an interest in 
 
 
 102. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 701 F. App’x. 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted, 138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018), rev’d and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 103.  Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019).  
 104.  Id. at 1418. 
 105. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 572–573 (2013). 
 106. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318 at *8 
(W.D. Wis. 2012). 
 107. Horton, supra note 77, at 8, 36–37; see Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and Not 
Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031, 1056–59 
(2017). California courts are not alone in arguing that in some situations, plaintiffs must have 
a way to pursue redress collectively in order to get any redress at all. Nor does this policy 
preference track a partisan political divide. Prior to Concepcion, appellate courts in Alabama, 
Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, and Washington all came to conclusions similar to the 
California Supreme Court’s. Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2002); 
S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Kinkel v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 271–73 (Ill. 2006) (collecting cases); Whitney v. 
Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Picardi v. Eighth Judicial 
Dist. Court of Nevada, 251 P.3d 723, 726 (Nev. 2011) (collecting cases); Scott v. Cingular 
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
 108. See Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1101–04. 
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promoting a view of the arbitrator as a quasi-judge as doing so leaves greater market 
share for the established organizations, as opposed to less experienced or nonlegally 
trained arbitrators.109 Furthermore, disclaiming jurisdiction in a specific case may be 
prudent if it avoids conflict with state courts or legislators. AAA already refuses to 
administer healthcare tort arbitrations like those at issue in Brown and Kindred unless 
ordered to do so by a court.110 An arbitrator acting under a broad delegation clause 
and AAA rules might thus sever such issues from an arbitration.  
Even if arbitrators are as unfriendly to state law as federal courts, state judges may 
have reason to prefer to let them decide. The possibility that arbitrators will be 
favorable to similar policy goals, combined with a desire to avoid a run-in with either 
the Supreme Court or the state legislature on preemption is reason enough for state 
courts to allow arbitrators to decide more. To do so, they can rely on the Court’s 
analogies between arbitral power and judicial power. 
State regulation of arbitral process matters because other avenues for controlling 
the use and conduct of arbitration are not available. On matters like class arbitration, 
the Court has used an expansive reading of the FAA to displace the judgment of 
current state legislative majorities in favor of contract drafters.111 It also matters 
because both federal and state courts have reason to favor expansive readings of 
contracts to arbitrate that allow arbitrators to be the first to decide a wide range of 
issues. This broad arbitral authority may in turn save some state rules from 
preemption if the rules are applied by arbitrators in the course of proceedings rather 
than by state courts determining whether to allow arbitration. 
II. RESPONDING THROUGH STATE LEVEL ARBITRATION REFORM 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has closed the most direct route to regulate 
undesirable arbitrations—an arbitration ban or a ban on arbitrations that do not offer 
certain procedures—and made regulation of the arbitration itself more important 
because more issues are decided by the arbitrator. State legislatures still occasionally 
 
 
 109. Arbitrators have done so in the international context. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT 
G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 57–61 (1996); Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Sociology of International Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 1, 5–6 (2015). Arbitrators in the types 
of cases that state courts have been concerned with are of a different professional class than 
those involved in international arbitration. Weidemaier, supra note 101, at 83–84 (observing 
that domestic bilateral arbitrations might not offer enough returns to draw expert lawyers or 
arbitrators); accord DEZALAY & GARTH, supra, at 124–25 (“Domestic arbitration . . . is much 
closer to the pole of business than to that of law.”). Yet they too might seek the increased 
professional respect that comes with deploying greater technical skill to comply with state law. 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1895, 1919 (2010) (“[A]rbitrators often operate in a competitive market in which future 
purchasers will choose an arbitrator based on perceptions about the arbitrator’s diligence, 
expertise, and impartiality.”). 
 110. See AAA Healthcare Policy Statement, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_Healthcare_Policy_State
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9MK-C6F4]. 
 111. See Horton, supra note 3, at 480 (discussing arbitration as delegation of lawmaking 
authority). 
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contemplate blanket arbitration bans for certain subject matter, but state courts likely 
cannot enact these bans without falling afoul of the FAA.112  
One route that remains open to arbitration critics is to seek regulations at the state 
level that do not limit arbitration, but rather turn it into something more palatable by 
making arbitration more like court. Such reforms help respond to fears of arbitrator 
bias and to the critique that arbitration procedures do not protect rights under state 
and federal statutes and amount to a backdoor waiver of those rights. As Daniel 
Markovits argues, a model of arbitration as contractual bargaining, rather than 
adjudication, may founder if the arbitrator must apply mandatory law113 If arbitration 
is asking an agent to fill gaps in a contract, then arbitration of statutory rights amounts 
to waiver of those rights.114 If the parties intend not to waive their legal rights, but to 
have the arbitrator adjudicate them, then courtlike due process rules are necessary in 
order for the arbitrator to have adequate authority to decide.115 If arbitration is private 
court and arbitrators are private judges, then similar conflict of interest rules should 
apply. As arbitrators adjudicate matters of public rights, the state also has an interest 
in basic due process guarantees and in reporting rules that allow the legislature to see 
how the law is being applied. Regulation of issues such as arbitral independence, 
procedure, and reporting of information related to arbitrations better fit a model of 
arbitration as third-party adjudication than they do the contract model. Doing so 
makes sense from the position that state legislatures are currently in, in which they 
cannot limit the Supreme Court’s expansions of arbitrator authority or the subject 
matter of arbitration.  
That state legislatures are likely to have to learn to live with arbitration has not 
escaped notice. Andrea Cann Chandersekar and David Horton have recently 
proposed that legislatures create “a bonus for plaintiffs’ lawyers who prevail in 
arbitration” to encourage lawyers to represent employees and consumers in arbitral 
fora.116 This proposal is based on their empirical research, which has shown that 
lawyers familiar with arbitration achieve better outcomes for their clients.117 An 
“arbitration multiplier,” as Chandrasekher and Horton refer to their scheme,118 might 
be particularly attractive if there are specific issues, such as class arbitration, on 
which arbitrators differ from federal judges in a manner the state legislature would 
 
 
 112. For instance, the New York State Senate recently passed a bill banning arbitration 
clauses in sexual harassment settlement agreements. Josefa Velasquez, NY Senate Passes Bill 
Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Sex Harassment Settlements, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 
12, 2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/03/12/ny-senate-passes 
-bill-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-in-sex-harassment-settlements [https://perma 
.cc/7HUR-T45B]. 
 113. Markovits, supra note 5, at 483 (allowing arbitration of statutory rights does not 
encroach on adjudication, but rather on legislation). 
 114. Id. at 482. 
 115. Id. at 473. Although Markovits believes that process rules will create adequate 
authority for the arbitrator’s decision, he takes no position on whether that authority should be 
wielded by an arbitrator. See id. 
 116. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 62. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 62–64 
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endorse.119 Encouraging arbitration of gateway issues might also slow the creation 
of a federal common law of arbitration that would cut off further avenues for reform.  
Policies encouraging arbitration would be a lot more palatable if state legislatures 
take greater control over the conduct of arbitration. State legislatures have 
undertaken reforms that would align with this model, and more have been 
proposed.120 States have regulated arbitrator conflicts of interest and created default 
due process rules. Additionally, states can regulate what arbitration providers 
disclose, requiring publication of statistics, or even of the awards themselves. Such 
regulation is not a panacea. To the extent that certain clauses effectively prevent an 
arbitration from ever getting off the ground, sending matters to an arbitrator may not 
be enough to allow it to launch.121 Careful drafters may design their contracts so that 
state law does not apply to the arbitration. Still, state legislatures may prefer a partial 
solution to none at all. Discussion of reform may also prod arbitration providers, 
which may adopt mandatory rules for arbitration clauses and refuse to hear disputes 
under nonconforming clauses.122 States might also be able to regulate in other ways, 
 
 
 119. Horton, supra note 77, at 19. 
 120. State legislators are not always likely innovators. Local politicians who hope to rise 
in status may be particularly risk averse and unlikely to innovate for fear that something could 
go wrong. State politicians will also have an incentive to wait for other states to run an 
experiment first. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 611 (1980). However, other forces may 
overcome these incentives. States start out with variations in their legal systems that may limit 
their ability to simply wait for another state to innovate and copy its choices. See Brian Galle 
& Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized 
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1347 (2009). A choice that voters in one state might view 
as risky and novel might be seen as preserving the status quo in a different state. Moreover, 
U.S. politicians remain connected across state lines through a national political party and to 
advocacy organizations, which may have adopted a program calling for change that relies on 
the states and may push its members to enact that program. But see Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 
615 (noting that such effects are “rather weak”). State legislatures might be more inclined to 
change their laws with respect to arbitration because change has already been forced on them 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court will not allow them to restore an earlier status quo by 
simply barring access to arbitration. State legislatures will now have to find new ways to 
accomplish some of the goals they hoped to accomplish through private rights of action in 
state court. 
 121. An example of such an exculpatory arbitration clause is the use of class action waivers 
in scenarios in which plaintiffs are likely to have negative value cases. A negative value case 
is one in which the cost of litigating or arbitrating on an individual basis exceeds the plaintiff’s 
expected recovery. In such scenarios, aggregation provides the only feasible way to plaintiffs 
to pursue redress. If they do not have access to it, existing evidence suggests that plaintiffs 
simply forgo bringing their claims at all. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2905–
08. 
 122. See, e.g., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N 1998), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository 
/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/6GY5-88J4]; 
EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 1995), https:// 
www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%20Process%20
Protocol_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5XM-WX7Q]; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION 
RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 17.  
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by focusing on the contracting parties or by creating new rights of action, but those 
reforms do not fall under the category of reforms to arbitration itself.123 
Along with the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act states, important just for their 
number, this Part pays special attention to California, New York, and Texas. 
California and New York are high-volume jurisdictions sometimes presented as 
taking opposite approaches to arbitration, with California treating it skeptically and 
New York embracing it. Despite their dissimilarity, both have undertaken or are 
considering reforms. Texas is simply a jurisdiction in which courts have been 
relatively active, especially when it comes to the law of vacatur. Academics and 
advocacy organizations have proposed additional reforms in the same vein as 
existing or proposed legislation. If enacted, these reforms would not make arbitration 
operate exactly like a state court but would provide procedural protections and help 
guarantee the adjudicator’s neutrality.  
Delaware, the home jurisdiction of many of the businesses that draft consumer 
and employment contracts, has generally not pursued reforms that treat arbitration as 
similar to litigation in court. Delaware uses the original 1956 Uniform Arbitration 
Act, which was not concerned with matters like conflicts of interest.124 The broad 
use of arbitration in ordinary consumer and employment scenarios did not then 
exist.125 Delaware has since updated portions of its arbitration law, but these changes 
are designed to serve corporate clients.126 The Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act, a 
procedural alternative to provider rules, explicitly excludes consumers and other 
“vulnerable parties.”127 
Along with the trans-substantive rules that are the focus of this Part, some states 
have other sets of arbitration rules for international arbitration128 and a variety of 
arbitrations administered by state agencies.129 At least twelve states have laws on the 
books related to health care arbitration. 130  Some of these laws refer to state-
administered or court-ordered arbitration.131 Others apply to all healthcare or medical 
 
 
 123. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (1956), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180530203049/http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactS
heet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(1956) [https://perma.cc/XJD3-3YAQ]. 
 125. Glover, supra note 4, at 3059–62. 
 126. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Innovation in Arbitration Law: The Case of Delaware, 
43 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 496–99 (2016). 
 127. Id. at 501–02. 
 128. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-21 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). 
 129. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.250 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018). 
 130. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (LexisNexis 2014); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (2016); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.19 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-61 (2007); 710 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/3 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4230–36 (2009 & Supp. 2019) (no 
procedural differences with other arbitrations, the statute provides for standard expiry date of 
agreements); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01–10 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 
2018); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406 (MCKINNEY 2018) (health maintenance organization 
contracts); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.60 (West 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-4 
(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.04 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2018). 
 131. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.60 (West 2008) (all parties must agree to state 
administered arbitration process); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25B-4, 6 (state court administers 
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malpractice claims.132 The portions of these laws that purport to require certain terms 
or that require that agreements to arbitrate end after a certain time period would be 
preempted under the Supreme Court’s FAA rulings.133 Other sections, such as those 
which offer a standard method of selecting arbitrators,134 fit the mold of the laws 
discussed here. Like general state arbitration laws, health care rules would be 
problematic if applied proactively to block arbitration. Arbitrators themselves might 
still follow them. As the next Part discusses, a stronger argument exists that they 
could be referenced in order to vacate an award.  
A. Ethics, Conflicts, and Competence 
Arbitration bans make sense from a perspective that treats arbitration as a contract 
to waive rights otherwise protected in court. Yet the Court has struck down these 
bans and insisted that agreeing to arbitrate a statutory right does not amount to 
waiving it. If arbitration is not to be a waiver of rights, then the parties will need a 
neutral adjudicator along with other procedural protections.135 If state legislatures are 
unlikely to be able to ban arbitration as a waiver of rights, perhaps they can regulate 
it as adjudication.  
Several states have conflict of interest rules, and new proposals would target 
perceived conflicts in consumer and employment arbitration. In cases of extreme bias 
that has prejudiced decisions, the state attorney general’s office may be able to act.136 
For more ordinary concerns, states might pass more robust disclosure rules for 
conflicts of interest.137 In a change from the 1956 Uniform Arbitration Act, the 2000 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) includes conflicts rules.138 The revisions 
 
 
arbitration for malpractice claims using arbitrators designated in part by state medical 
providers). 
 132. E.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/8 (West 2018) (purporting to regulate agreements 
to arbitrate in healthcare settings). 
 133. See, e.g., Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) 
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the state’s Health Care Arbitration Act 
providing that contracts to arbitrate will no longer be valid more than two years after 
execution). 
 134. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(f) (2016) (providing for three-member board with 
two party-appointed arbitrators and one neutral appointed by the other two arbitrators). 
 135. Markovits, supra note 5, at 481–83. 
 136. In one egregious case of abuse, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), previously the 
largest provider of arbitration in consumer debt disputes, was accused of hiding its financial 
relationships to the debt collection firms bringing consumers to arbitration. After the 
Minnesota Attorney General sued, the NAF entered a consent decree under which it agreed to 
stop administering consumer arbitrations. Consent Judgment at 1–2, Minnesota v. Nat’l 
Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWB7-V8DN]. 
 137. See Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review 
of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 545–48 (2009). 
 138. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, 
Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia have 
adopted the RUAA. It has been introduced in Massachusetts and Vermont. Legislative Fact 
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in the Act were driven in part by mounting concern for consumers and employees.139 
Section 11(b) states that an individual who has a “known, existing, and substantial 
relationship with a party” may not serve as a neutral arbitrator.140 Section 12 creates 
a continuing obligation to disclose “any known facts that a reasonable person would 
consider likely to affect” the arbitrator’s impartiality.141 It specifically enumerates 
“financial or personal interest” in the outcome, “existing or past relationship” with 
the parties, their counsel, witnesses, or the other arbitrators. 142  The rules have 
potential bite because failure to disclose creates a ground for vacating an award.143 
However, provider rules on disclosures can supersede this section.144  
Few state courts have had occasion to discuss this part of the RUAA in depth. The 
Hawaii Supreme Court takes a strict approach to violations of disclosure rules. Such 
violations create a presumption of evident partiality, and “if a neutral arbitrator 
demonstrates evident partiality, the arbitration award shall be vacated.”145 Similarly, 
Texas appellate courts have treated an arbitrator’s failure to disclose that a lawyer 
for one side had previously appeared in front of him or her as creating “evident 
partiality” requiring that the award be vacated under the FAA and Texas Arbitration 
Act.146 
The California Arbitration Act goes further in giving the parties the ability to 
investigate and disqualify arbitrators. The Act states that if a person is “to serve as a 
neutral arbitrator” under an arbitration agreement, the neutral “shall disclose all 
matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt 
that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial.”147 It then offers a 
non-exhaustive list, including whether one party has appeared before the arbitrator 
or otherwise used his or her services in the last two years or is in discussions to use 
the arbitrator’s services in another case, is in any attorney-client relationship with a 
 
 
Sheet—Arbitration Act (2000), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170108233429/http://www.uniformlaws.org 
/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [https://perma.cc/5WCV-
P3JH]. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia follow the 1956 Uniform Arbitration 
Act. Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (1956), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180530203049/http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactS
heet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(1956) [https://perma.cc/3WKR-ZJ8F]. 
 139. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating 
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of 
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985, 1008 (2012). 
 140. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) § 11(b), 7 U.L.A. 44 (2009). 
 141. Id. § 12(a). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. § 12(c)–(e). 
 144. See id. § 12(f). 
 145. Noel Madamba Contracting LLC v. Romero, 364 P.3d 518, 533 (Haw. 2015) 
(alteration to the original); see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009).  
 146. Builders First Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, 515 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App. 2017), 
review denied (June 2, 2017); Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root)—Halliburton, 331 
S.W.3d 178, 182 (Tex. App. 2011). 
 147. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a) (West 2007). 
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party, or is in any personal relationship with a party.148 The arbitrator must also 
disclose all parties who are not natural persons involved in “all prior or pending 
noncollective bargaining cases in which the proposed neutral arbitrator served or is 
serving” as neutral arbitrator, partisan arbitrator, or lawyer.149 In keeping with the 
idea of arbitrators as judge-like independent neutrals, the Act gives ongoing 
rulemaking power to the California Judicial Council.150 Additionally, California bars 
arbitration providers with a financial interest in the outcome from administering 
consumer arbitrations.151 California courts do not treat these rules as preempted by 
the FAA.152 
A bill in the last New York State legislative session would have followed 
California’s lead and required a “neutral third-party arbitrator.”153 For appointment 
to “reasonably ensure the personal objectivity of the arbitrator,” the arbitrator should 
disclose to the parties and other arbitrators “any known facts that a reasonable person 
would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration 
 
 
 148. Id. § 1281.9(a)(1), (5)–(6). 
 149. Id. § 1281.9(a)(3)–(4). 
 150. Id. § 1281.9(a)(2). 
 151. Id. § 1281.92(b). The Northern District of California refused to set aside an award 
from the National Association of Securities Dealers on the basis of this state law because it 
determined that the rule was preempted in an unreported case. However, the reasoning in this 
decision is not terribly convincing. The court states that the FAA does not occupy the field, 
then seemed to reference section 2 preemption, which had to do with enforcement of an 
arbitration clause in the context of deciding whether to vacate an award under section 10 of 
the FAA. Section 10 arguably has a narrower scope because it is directed specifically at federal 
courts, but the district court did not address this issue. See In re Arbitration between Lemoine 
Skinner III v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. C 03–2625 VRW, 2003 WL 
23174478, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2003). 
 152. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California decided that the rules 
were preempted by the Securities and Exchange Act and section 2 of the FAA, when a plaintiff 
asked that court to apply them in a dispute with a broker. However, in that case the plaintiff 
had explicitly agreed to standards that followed federal securities law and conceded to the 
court that he was not entitled to California standards. Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1114–16 (N.D. Cal. 2003). California state appellate courts have 
continued to apply the California standards after the northern district decision and even 
after Concepcion. Gray v. Chiu, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 798–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (noting 
arbitrator’s failure to comply with disclosure rules requires trial court to vacate the award); Mt. 
Holyoke Homes, L.P. v. Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, LLP, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 607–
08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (nothing that the arbitrator failed to disclose that he listed defendant 
attorney in legal malpractice arbitration as a reference, thus his award was void); Advantage 
Med. Servs., LLC v. Hoffman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 935, 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a 
party has right to vacate award because arbitrator failed to disclose business relationship); 
Azteca Constr., Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 148–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (nothing that neutrality of arbitrators is “of such crucial importance” that parties do not 
waive rights to California standards by agreeing to AAA rules).  However, they do not treat 
any violation of the standards as voiding an arbitral award. United Health Ctrs. of San Joaquin 
Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that 
the arbitrator failed to comply with disclosure obligations and award may be voidable if one 
party was unaware of this failure). 
 153. Assemb. 10393, 241th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7504 (N.Y. 2018). 
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proceeding” before being appointed and has a continuing obligation to disclose such 
facts.154 The bill specifically singled out financial interests and prior legal work by 
the arbitrator.155 Awards could be vacated if the arbitrator failed to disclose material 
facts or continues to act over a party’s objection.156 If an arbitrator failed to disclose 
a “known, direct and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration” or a “known, 
existing and substantial relationship with a party” the award would be presumptively 
void due to the arbitrator’s “evident partiality.”157  
Academics have proposed further reforms. Jeffrey Stempel suggested that states 
license arbitrators deemed to be “sufficiently independent” and likely to recuse 
themselves when doing so was proper. 158  Arbitration providers would also be 
licensed on the basis of their rosters of licensed arbitrators.159 Stempel proposed 
licensing as an opportunity to screen out arbitrators who were unlikely to have the 
ability to correctly identify and apply mandatory law.160 Parties could then complain 
to a licensing agency if something went wrong, rather than undertaking the cost of 
investigating the arbitrator up front.161 Stempel’s argument is driven by his view that 
arbitration stands in for court: “Because arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by 
litigation, the logical default rule for assessing an arbitrator’s neutrality should be the 
neutrality norms found in the litigation system.”162 Kristen Blankley reached for a 
similar rationale in arguing that states should amend perjury and evidence tampering 
laws to apply explicitly to arbitration.163  
State courts would not be able to enforce a licensing requirement when ordering 
arbitration. However, state legislatures could offer incentives for certification such 
as licensing for arbitrators and provider organizations,164 access to state contracts,165 
certification to a list of “approved” organizations that businesses are encouraged to 
use, tax incentives, and access to business from regulated industries.166 
 
 
 154. Id. § 7504(b)–(c). 
 155. Id. § 7504(c)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 156. Id. § 7504(c)(3)–(4). 
 157. Id. § 7504(c)(5). 
 158. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. 
L.J. 251, 262 (2007).  
 159. Id. at 263. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 260. 
 163. Kristen M. Blankley, Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 
925, 960 (2012) (using the heading “Arbitration Is Simply an Alternate Forum, Providing the 
Same Rights as a Court”). 
 164. Huber, supra note 137, at 545–46. In designing a licensing scheme, regulators need 
not work off a blank slate, but rather could draw on ethics rules and best practices developed 
by the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution and College of Commercial Arbitrators. 
 165. For instance, some state governments have outsourced adjudications to AAA. See The 
American Arbitration Association: A Long History of Working with Government, AM. ARB. 
ASS’N 1, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA%20Government 
%20Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/M69K-6NWT]. 
 166. Federal regulation of arbitration follows this pattern; for instance, SEC regulations 
mean that securities industry arbitration for investors avoids many of the abuses seen in other 
areas of consumer arbitration. Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration, 30 
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B. Due Process Rules 
Along with designating arbitrators as independent neutrals, several states have 
adopted due process rules. Some state legislatures or state courts have drawn a 
specific consequence for failure to comply with conflict of interest rules: a 
presumption of evident partiality that allows the award to be vacated. The 
consequences of failing to comply with some or all of the state’s due process rules 
are more nebulous. Failure to comply with the rules is not a bar to arbitration, but 
procedural factors can weigh in a fact-specific unconscionability analysis.167 State 
courts have the option to sever problematic provisions rather than refuse to compel 
arbitration and set up an FAA preemption fight.168 Their ability to do so is enhanced 
if they know how the arbitration will be conducted. State process rules serve as 
defaults. 
The RUAA’s requirements are quite basic; all parties have the right to hire a 
lawyer and have notice of hearings.169 Summary disposition is only allowed if the 
nonmoving side has notice and an opportunity to respond.170 The arbitrator must also 
have adequate tools to help the parties pursue a case, such as the power to issue 
subpoenas and oversee discovery.171 Likewise, the arbitrator must be able to order 
punitive damages and apply statutory rules on fee shifting.172 
Texas sets some default process rules including notice173 and basic rights to be 
heard, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses.174 Additionally, parties 
have a right to an attorney and cannot waive that right prior to the arbitration.175 Any 
award must be in writing, which may be useful for allowing more meaningful 
review.176 Texas also allows the parties to go to court to ask for an order setting a 
time limit by which the arbitrator must produce the award.177 
 
 
PACE L. REV. 1174, 1186–87 (2010).  
 167. However, the likelihood that these factors will add up to a refusal to compel arbitration 
is slim. See Sanchez v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal. LLC, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 478, 480, 
482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (considering several procedural defects including secrecy and lack 
of discovery but determining that they nonetheless did not render the agreement 
unconscionable). 
 168. Burgoon v. Narconon, No. 15-CV-01381-EMC, 2016 WL 192536, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 15, 2016) (severing provisions unconscionable under California law). 
 169. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) §§ 16–17(c), 7 U.L.A. 44 (2009). Although it has not 
adopted the Act, Maryland has similar rules. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-216 
(LexisNexis 2013). 
 170. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) § 15(b) cmt. 3. 
 171. Id. § 17(a)-(e). 
 172. Id. § 21(a)–(c). 
 173. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.044 (West 2011). 
 174. Id. § 171.047. Other states have similar rules. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-8 (2007); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-214 (LexisNexis 2013). 
 175. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 171.048. 
 176. Id. § 171.053. Other states are similar to Texas on this matter. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
10 (2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4208 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-219 
(LexisNexis 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.08 (West 2001). 
 177. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 171.053. 
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Incorporated into the state civil procedure code, California’s arbitration rules also 
reflect minimum due process standards. The rules create defaults the parties must 
explicitly contract around. The rules include basic elements of procedural fairness, 
such as access to a lawyer and to the information before the adjudicator. 178 
Arbitrators must issue a written award determining “all questions . . . the decision of 
which is necessary in order to determine the controversy” and allow court 
reporters.179 Both these elements make it easier to challenge an award. However, 
courts mainly use the first provision to determine whether they are, in fact, faced 
with an arbitration award when asked to confirm or vacate an arbitrator’s 
decision.180 Parties to tort arbitrations also have specific discovery rights.181  
Additionally, California limits awards of fees and costs for cases under a certain 
value.182 The provision applies to all arbitrations in the state, even if they are not 
conducted under California law.183 State and federal courts have used the provision 
to bolster their conclusion that arbitration clauses that would involve high fees are 
substantively unconscionable.184 The provision has avoided a fatal collision with 
section 2 because of the way it has been read down. The Supreme Court of California 
treats the fee rule as a provision that must be applied on a “case-by-case” basis to 
determine unconscionability.185  
New York has had few procedural rules for arbitration. Proposed legislation 
would have added a specific rule on adjournments and required notice by a party who 
 
 
 178. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.2(g) (West 2007) (“If a neutral arbitrator intends to base 
an award upon information not obtained at the hearing, he shall disclose the information to all 
parties to the arbitration and give the parties an opportunity to meet it.”); CIV. PROC. § 1282.4 
(noting that parties have a right to an attorney and if one side hires an attorney at any point in 
the proceedings, the other side has the right to seek one as well before continuing). 
 179. CIV. PROC. § 1283.4 (requiring written, signed award determining all issues that must 
be determined to dispose of arbitration); id. § 1282.5 (creating right to transcription by a 
“certified shorthand reporter”). 
 180. See, e.g., Judge v. Superior Court, No. B267694, 2016 WL 4272030, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 15, 2016), cert. denied, sub nom. Nijjar Realty, Inc. v. Judge, 138 S. Ct. 68 (2017) 
(“When is an arbitration award not an arbitration award? When it does not ‘include a 
determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is 
necessary in order to determine the controversy,’ as required 
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4.”); Cinel v. Christopher, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 
769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the trial court could not confirm award because “there 
was no substantive award”).   
 181. CIV. PROC. §§ 1283.05, 1283.1. 
 182. California requires that cost and fees in consumer arbitrations be waived for those 
within 300% of the federal poverty line (in 2016, this amount was around $35,000 for a single 
person and $73,000 for a family of four). CIV. PROC. § 1284.3(b)(1). To make consumers aware 
of the rule, California regulates provider organizations in addition to individual arbitrators. 
Arbitration providers must provide notice of the right to a fee waiver and cannot demand 
evidence beyond the consumer’s declaration under oath of his monthly income and household 
size. Id. § 1284.3(b)(2)–(3). 
 183. CIV. PROC. § 1284.3(c). 
 184. See, e.g., Penilla v. Westmont Corp., 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016); Gentry v. Empire Med. Training, No. 13-CV-02254-WHO, 2013 WL 4647530, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 185. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 754 (Cal. 2015). 
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intends to call a witness.186 The bill would also have required that written awards 
“state the issues in dispute and contain the arbitrator’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law” for all issues submitted and be “executed under oath.”187 
Political pressure on states to regulate process may be reduced because pressure 
on arbitration providers themselves has proven partially successful. 188  The 
companies most likely to draft their contracts to get around any unfavorable state 
rules are those with the largest number of disputes. Those companies may also be 
also the least able to change arbitration providers because they have come to rely on 
a given provider’s capacity and processes and because choosing a new and unproven 
provider exposes them to greater risk. Thus, targeting large providers might be a 
more effective way to protect large numbers of arbitration users. For instance, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took the approach of regulating 
providers directly in its arbitration rule. Had the rule not been overturned under the 
Congressional Review Act, it would have required the parties to follow provider 
rules, such as consumer due process protocol.189  
C. Information Rules 
Some arbitrations are confidential, meaning that the arbitration clause specifically 
prohibits disclosure; others are merely private, in that the public is not invited in and 
an award may not be easily accessible.190 Neither confidentiality nor privacy have to 
be defaults. Information rules do not necessarily require legislators to view 
arbitrators as judges. Such rules might reflect a model of arbitration providers as a 
regulated industry, but not as courts. However, rules such as requiring published 
decisions would make it easier to see arbitrators as third-party adjudicators. Proposed 
and existing rules involve everything from collecting anonymized statistics, to 
requiring published decisions, to allowing observers to an arbitration.  
California enacted a law requiring arbitration organizations to publish quarterly 
statistics on outcomes in consumer arbitrations that can be used to assess how 
consumers are using the system and what kind of relief they are getting.191 The 
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Maine have followed with similar laws.192 
 
 
 186. S.B. A10393, 241th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 383, 417 (2008) (arguing that protocols are consistently implemented, pointed to need 
for government guarantee); Stipanowich, supra note 139, at 993. 
 189. 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(b)(1). 
 190. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 30 (2015) (“[A]rbitration is a private process, 
not a confidential one.”). 
 191. But see Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2894–2900 (describing 
difficulties in obtaining reliable data on consumer arbitration). 
 192. KEVIN G. BAKER, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., MANDATORY CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION: HAS COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA’S LANDMARK DATA TRANSPARENCY LAW 
BEEN SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH THE LEGISLATURE’S GOALS? 9 (Mar. 18, 2013) 
http://ajud.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ajud.assembly.ca.gov/files/reports/Arbitration%20Data%20
Background%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQD8-RHQK]. 
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California has run into trouble getting arbitration providers to comply with its law. 
Several studies have found missing and incomplete data.193 The District of Columbia 
has created an express private right of action aimed at solving this problem.194 The 
National Consumer Law Center has proposed still more extensive disclosure 
requirements, which would include party names and information about the conduct 
of the arbitration.195 
Proposals by Sarah Rudolph Cole and Teresa Verges would go further, requiring 
accessible and reasoned awards as a default matter.196 The CFPB’s rule would have 
required all arbitration documents to be available in a public, searchable database.197 
Publishing awards would subject arbitrators to greater scrutiny, which can control 
for bias and serve as an incentive to produce awards that conform with the law. Public 
awards also reduce the power of repeat parties by giving parties new to an arbitration 
system more information about how arbitrators will decide.198 In some contexts, 
public awards are already available, but the public does not necessarily know how to 
access them.199 Reporting rules vary by provider and can change. State reporting 
guidelines would create a clear baseline for what is available and apply across 
providers, making public access easier.  
Although state legislatures might want to require statistical reporting that 
encompasses all arbitrations of a certain type, publication should be more selective. 
State legislatures may want to set rules for when reasoned awards are required.200  
Court systems control the direction of precedent by choosing which opinions to 
report. Unreasoned decisions are common in both federal and state court. 201 
Published opinions require greater judicial resources and create a risk of 
 
 
 193. Id. at 7–8; Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 645. 
 194. BAKER, supra note 192, at 9. 
 195. DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE MODEL STATE CONSUMER & 
EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT 51–54 (2015). 
 196. Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Lost Promise of Arbitration, 70 SMU L. REV. 849, 868 
(2017). See generally Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the Arbitration Forum as a Response to 
Mandatory Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 437 (arguing that the rise of mandatory arbitration 
requires a more public, regularized system similar to FINRA’s). 
 197. 12 C.F.R. §1040.4(b). 
 198. See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1001–03 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 
benefits of publication for evening the playing field and helping alert plaintiffs to like cases); 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1895, 1923 (2010). 
 199. Cole, supra note 196, at 867–68. 
 200. New York’s criteria offer a good starting point for when reasoning might be required. 
See New York Official Reports: Selection of Opinions for Publication, N.Y. STATE L. 
REPORTING BUREAU, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/selection.shtml [https://perma 
.cc/AD7T-56UD] (listing precedential significance, novelty, public importance, practical 
significance, subject matter diversity, geographic diversity, and author diversity). Arbitrators 
may, of course, apply these criteria imperfectly, just as judges do. See Lauren K. Robel, The 
Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 954 (1989). Moreover, any 
unpublished awards may be perceived as unfair, particularly by less sophisticated parties. See 
Gross, supra note 166, at 1186. 
 201. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995).  
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inconsistency or bad precedent.202 To publish more opinions with the same resources, 
quality must go down. For this reason, state court systems do not publish most of 
their opinions. Some may be available and even citable despite being unreported; 
others are not available at all.203  
Existing arbitration systems provide several additional models, suggesting that 
large providers are capable of administering a publication scheme. AAA publishes 
redacted versions of its consumer and employment arbitration awards with both 
Lexis and Westlaw. AAA commonly redacts party names, a practice states may want 
to disallow. Verges’s publication proposal is inspired by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA)’s arbitration scheme. 204  FINRA administers 
arbitrations involving investors and industry parties, such as brokers and brokerage 
firms, as well as arbitrations between industry parties.205 Most arbitrations settle, but 
FINRA reports outcomes for those its arbitrators resolve.206 Arbitrators must issue 
written decisions that are publicly available, but need not explain their reasoning 
unless they choose to do so or the parties jointly request it.207 State legislatures could 
also refer to the detailed requirements for public awards in the CFPB’s former rule.208  
Finally, some state legislators and scholars have raised the issue of public access 
to arbitration proceedings themselves. A New York Assembly Bill would not have 
created a right of access but would have given arbitrators discretion to admit third 
parties to observe the arbitration.209  Judith Resnik has argued that procedurally 
legitimate arbitration would include open access to the proceedings, resembling 
public access to federal court.210 Resnik is not only concerned with the public’s right 
 
 
 202. Robel, supra note 200, at 961 (describing prudential reasons behind judges’ support 
for limiting publication). 
 203. See generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court 
Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
349 (2004) (collecting rules by circuit, district, and state). As dockets grew, nonprecedential 
opinions became more common even in the federal circuit courts. Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Politics of the Federal Judiciary: Tiered Appellate Decisionmaking, 89 JUDICATURE 20, 20–
21 (2005). 
 204. See Verges, supra note 196, at 439. 
 205. See Stipanowich, supra note 139, at 1022; Weidemaier, supra note 198, at 1918–20. 
Arbitration in FINRA or through other providers has been the dominant mode of dispute 
resolution in the industry for over twenty years. Gross, supra note 166, at 1179. The SEC’s 
regulatory authority extends to regulating the content of arbitration clauses in contracts and 
FINRA’s code of arbitration procedure includes basic procedural protections. Id. 
 206. Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and 
-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics [https://perma.cc/6G8H-PXV2]. FINRA maintains a 
database of its awards as well as awards from pre-FINRA securities arbitrators. Arbitration 
Awards Online, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/arbitration-awards 
[https://perma.cc/4EEV-WM59]. 
 207. FINRA MANUAL § 12904, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid 
=2403&element_id=4192 [https://perma.cc/J9SL-AZTG]; id. § 13904, http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4292 [https://perma.cc/B4HY 
-7M5Q]. 
 208. 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4. 
 209. S.B. A10393, § 2(e) 241th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 210. See Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 622–29 (discussing open access to courts). 
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to know, but also views access rights as rights for the parties to the dispute. In her 
view, the threat of public observation is necessary to maintain effective due 
process.211 Public access would then be a due process right that protects the parties 
to the arbitration. Discretionary access, such as that in the New York proposal, 
suggests that access is instead about the rights of third parties, those with related 
cases or select press or public interest groups in an arbitration with public 
implications. 
States could adapt to the Supreme Court’s expansion of arbitral authority by 
imposing ethics rules, due process rules, and information rules. These rules could 
help ensure that arbitrations conducted in the state meet minimum standards of 
adjudicator independence, fairness, and transparency. Some arbitration providers and 
the arbitrators that work with them might have an interest in voluntarily complying. 
Moreover, a strong argument exists that state courts can vacate awards on grounds 
not covered by the FAA. Fear of being overturned might push arbitrators to comply. 
Imposing these rules represents a choice to view arbitrators as third-party 
adjudicators. If arbitration were instead viewed as bargaining over a contract, 
arbitrators would be the parties’ agents. Subjecting arbitrators to rules aimed at 
ensuring their neutrality and constraining the approach that the parties use in 
resolving their dispute would not make sense under that paradigm. Nor would 
making the results of that process or the process itself public be necessary. State 
legislators have good reason to make the choice to view arbitration as adjudication, 
namely the power that arbitrators have over the extent of their own jurisdiction and 
over mandatory law, as well as the lack of other regulatory options, such as banning 
the arbitration of certain types of disputes. This choice, however, may open their 
legislation to attack as being preempted by federal arbitration law, particularly if the 
Supreme Court conceptualizes arbitration differently. It also raises questions about 
the limits of an analogy between arbitration and common law judging.  
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DURING AND AFTER ARBITRATION 
The state rules discussed above could end up preempted by federal law in two 
ways. First, the Supreme Court might treat FAA sections 9, 10, and 11, which have 
to do with award enforcement, just as expansively as section 2, limiting the ability 
of state courts to reject nonconforming awards. Second, the Court might create a sort 
of penumbra to section 2, reading it to protect a certain ideal of arbitration that the 
state reforms violate with their judicial model.212  
Such an extension of FAA preemption is not a foregone conclusion. The text of 
the FAA suggests that its provisions related to vacatur apply only to federal court. 
Moreover, the posture of any preemption challenge will be different from section 2 
challenges in which a state judge has refused to allow arbitration. Instead, those 
claiming that state laws are preempted will in most cases be making their arguments 
to arbitrators first. Given the wide discretion arbitrators have under the FAA, parties 
may find it harder to get an arbitrator’s decision applying state law overturned in 
federal court. If the arbitrator does not apply the state rules and a state court rejects 
 
 
 211. See id. at 615–18. 
 212. Thanks to David Horton for suggesting this wording. 
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the award, the posture of the case may still make a federal law challenge harder to 
mount. 
A. Preemption and the Rules of Award Enforcement 
An arbitral award might be subject to review in court in one of two ways. If the 
loser of the arbitration seeks to challenge the result, he or she can ask a court to vacate 
the award. The loser can also simply refuse to comply. In that case, the winner will 
have to go to court to seek confirmation of the award and an order requiring 
enforcement. Under section 9 of the FAA, any party seeking to confirm an award can 
go to federal district court and the district court “must grant” confirmation unless the 
award is vacated under section 10.213  
The FAA allows vacatur of awards for a short list of reasons related to arbitrator 
misconduct or excess of power.214 In several circuits “manifest disregard of the law” 
provides an additional ground for vacatur, although its status is contested and the 
contours of review for manifest disregard are narrowly drawn. 215  The Court’s 
decision in Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter helps illustrate just how narrow federal 
review is.216 Before and after Oxford Health Plans, Supreme Court majorities made 
clear that they viewed class arbitration procedures as deeply problematic and likely 
never something arbitrators could order if the parties did not expressly agree to it.217 
However, in Oxford Health Plans, a unanimous Court refused to vacate an arbitral 
award that read a contract as allowing class arbitration even though the Court found 
such a reading implausible.218  
If the party seeking to vacate an award gets to state court before the party seeking 
to confirm it gets to federal court, state courts may have a wider scope to review 
arbitral decisions. Both the text of the FAA and the Court’s current approach suggest 
that enforcement decisions remain a matter of state law.219 Section 9 of the FAA, 
 
 
 213. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
 214. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 215. See Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always 
Pro-arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1014–16 (2010) (describing review of arbitral 
awards for manifest disregard of law and explaining its limited scope). The Second Circuit has 
connected its manifest disregard analysis under the FAA to the Supreme Court’s willingness 
to vacate labor arbitration awards for violation of public policy. Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., 665 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court’s reason for doing so, that the 
arbitration award represents a contract and is subject to the “doctrine, rooted in the common 
law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy” would seem 
to support the Second Circuit’s approach. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. 
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987). 
 216. 569 U.S. 564 (2013). 
 217. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418–19 (2019); Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 
(2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). 
 218. 569 U.S. at 572–73. 
 219.  Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. 
AM. ARB. 1, 30–31 (2004). The Court has treated FAA preemption as conflict, rather than field 
preemption, so state law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law. Id.; 
see also Huber, supra note 137, at 522–31 (acknowledging that several leading arbitration 
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which governs confirmation of arbitral awards, states that: “If no court is specified 
in the agreement of the parties, then such application [for confirmation] may be made 
to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was 
made.”220 Unlike section 2, section 9 explicitly contemplates action by the federal 
courts. sections 10 and 11, which govern vacatur of awards, similarly refer to “[t]he 
United States district court for the district wherein an award was made.”221 Several 
state supreme courts and the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands have ruled that the 
FAA’s provisions on confirmation and vacatur do not preempt state law.222 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel provides 
additional support for this view.223 There, the Court held that the FAA created an 
exclusive list of reasons for a court to refuse to enforce an award and that the parties 
could not contract for more searching judicial review.224 However, the Court stated 
that “[t]he FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of 
arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or 
common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope” might be 
allowed.225  
Both the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act have 
vacatur rules resembling those in the FAA.226 State actors could go further; in some 
cases, they have done so. Georgia’s arbitration statute allows courts to vacate awards 
for manifest disregard of law.227 New Hampshire allows courts to vacate awards for 
“plain mistake.”228 District of Columbia courts will vacate an award that conflicts 
with public policy.229 None of these standards are to be found in the FAA. State 
courts may also give different content to state rules that do track the FAA. As 
discussed above, state courts may read arbitrator disclosure rules into the idea of 
“evident partiality” under the FAA or RUAA.230 The California Supreme Court 
 
 
scholars assume preemption of state law on award enforcement, but arguing that the text of 
the FAA does not support this view). 
 220. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
 221. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2012). 
 222. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, Dep’t of Educ. v. St. Tomas/St. John Educ. Administrators’ 
Ass’n, Local 101, o.b.o. Forde, No. 2016-0105, 2017 WL 3141829, at *4 (V.I. July 20, 2017) 
(collecting cases from Alabama, California, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas). Although the Texas appellate case cited by the Virgin Island’s court is no longer good 
law, the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that the Texas Arbitration Act, which has different 
language from the FAA, can be used to vacate an award and that the parties can also contract 
for greater review in state court. Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. 2016). 
 223. Huber, supra note 137 at 535–36. 
 224. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). 
 225. Id. at 590. 
 226. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 22–23 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT §§ 11–12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1955) (amended 1956). 
 227. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (2007). 
 228. Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC, 143 A.3d 859, 872 (N.H. 2016). 
 229. A1 Team USA Holdings, LLC v. Bingham McCutchen, LLP, 998 A.2d 320, 327 
(D.C. 2010). 
 230. See supra Section II.A. 
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recently reaffirmed its ruling that arbitrators exceed their powers under the California 
Arbitration Act if they issue an award that violated California public policy.231 
Additionally, California and New Jersey allow parties to contract for more judicial 
review.232 Parties might want review if the arbitrators must apply mandatory rules of 
law and it is important to the parties that the law be applied predictably. Antitrust or 
employment might be areas where a contract drafter would choose greater court 
oversight, as the statutes and case law are complex and the defendant could be 
exposed to high damages.  
Although the text of the FAA suggests that state vacatur rules should not be 
preempted, one might argue that stricter standards of review impinge on the parties’ 
ability to arbitrate and thus would be preempted. The drafters of the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act were concerned enough about this possibility that they decided that 
the RUAA’s criteria for vacatur should mirror the FAA.233 Some state courts have 
taken this view.234  The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated that limited review 
“substantiat[es] a national policy favoring arbitration” in the FAA.235 The Court 
might view the possibility of more stringent review under state law as interference 
with arbitration. However, dicta in Hall Street suggest that it may not do so. There, 
the Court stated that parties “may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or 
common law . . . where judicial review of different scope is arguable.”236 The state 
rules the Court has viewed as interfering with arbitration have thus far been rules that 
state courts applied ex ante through section 2—invoked at the point at which the state 
court is deciding whether to enforce a contract to arbitrate and placing conditions on 
that enforcement.  
Decisions about award enforcement do not invoke the same contract logic as 
decisions on a motion to compel. Rather, they more easily put the arbitrator in the 
posture of being a third-party neutral. At this point, the court is not concerned only 
with the content of the contract, but also with the decision rendered and the conduct 
of the arbitration.237 However, this decision still involves reviewing the arbitrator’s 
decision about the contract. The standard of review may be generous, but the posture 
of the case resembles situations in which courts review the result of an agency’s or 
lower court’s adjudication. When the logic of arbitrator as third-party adjudicator 
operates, and the arbitrator’s authority can be analogized to judicial authority, then it 
can be regulated in the same way, through appellate review and process standards.238 
Another question is whether the parties would end up in state or federal court 
seeking to enforce state rules. Under the FAA, parties do not have the ability to go 
to federal court to bring interlocutory challenges to arbitration procedure.239 State 
 
 
 231. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., 425 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 
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 234. Gross, supra note 219, at 20–27. 
 235. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). 
 236. Id. at 590. 
 237. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 238. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetric Dynamism and Acceptable Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 53 (2013). 
 239. Parties may go to court to compel arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 4, appoint an arbitrator, 9 
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rules could differ. The FAA gives parties the option of going to federal court to 
confirm or challenge an award.240 The winner in an arbitration that did not follow 
state rules could race to the federal courthouse before the other party can get to state 
court. Still, the possibility of either interlocutory review in state court or having the 
award invalidated in state court first may be enough to encourage most arbitrators to 
comply. 
B. The FAA Section 2 Jurisprudence 
The Court’s existing FAA section 2 jurisprudence relies in part on a contrast 
between litigation in court and arbitration. The state rules discussed here would blur 
it. If applied by state courts to reject arbitrations, they would clearly be preempted. 
The question then becomes whether the rules would apply in arbitration. Section 2 
of the FAA is addressed to courts and not to arbitrators, but the Court’s essentialist 
treatment of arbitration, much of it under section 2, provides a hook for rejecting the 
application of state laws that make arbitration look more like court.241 So too does 
Preston v. Ferrer, under which the FAA “supplies not simply a procedural 
framework applicable in federal courts; it also calls for the application, in state as 
well as federal courts, of federal substantive law regarding arbitration.”242 Section 2 
arguments could both be a justification for reducing state courts’ range of motion 
with respect to vacatur and striking down state laws or regulations designed to 
incentivize arbitration providers to adopt certain rules. 
Preston limits the impact of state procedural rules because it calls into question 
the Supreme Court’s earlier Volt Information Sciences opinion. In Volt, the Court 
affirmed that state courts were the interpreters of state law, including whether a 
contract incorporated state law on arbitration procedures.243 Later, in Mastrobuono 
and again in Preston, the parties’ choice of a specific set of arbitration rules overrode 
state defaults.244 The Preston court did not defer to the state courts and limited the 
agreement’s choice-of-law clause to choice of substantive, and not procedural, state 
law.245 The Court distinguished Mastrobuono from Volt by characterizing the state 
rules in Volt as facilitating arbitration and the rule at issue in Mastrobuono, a rule 
that arbitrators could not award punitive damages, as constraining arbitration.246 It 




U.S.C. § 5, compel a witness to testify at an arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 7, or confirm or vacate an 
award, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11. 
 240. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012). 
 241. See Bookman, supra note 5, at 28.  
 242. 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008). 
 243. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 
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 245. Preston, 552 U.S. at 363. 
 246. See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in 
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 199 (2002). 
 247. Id. at 204, 206–07. 
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The drafters of the RUAA contrasted procedural rules with “front end” and “back 
end” limits on arbitration imposed by state court. They believed preemption 
“unlikely” because rules for arbitral procedure “do not go to the essence of the 
agreement to arbitrate or effectuation of the arbitral result.”248 After Preston, the 
distinction between rules that inhibit and rules that facilitate arbitration may be less 
significant. Moreover, the Court’s view of whether the state rules discussed above 
facilitate arbitration will turn on whether it believes arbitration to be closer to a 
contract-based bargaining process or a process of adjudication. The state rules would 
facilitate adjudication by an independent neutral, but might frustrate informal 
bargaining. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s concept of preemption under section 2 of the FAA 
extends to any state law that “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”249 
Those fundamental attributes have sometimes been defined in dicta as the opposite 
of litigation in court.250 If court process is slow and expensive, arbitration is quick 
and cheap. Litigation in court can allow extensive discovery in order to get at truth, 
while arbitration offers rough, commercial justice. In Hall Street, the Court cited 
arbitration’s “essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway” as a reason not to 
allow parties to contract for greater judicial review. 251  In Stolt-Nielsen v. 
AnimalFeeds, the one decision in which the Court has held that arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, the majority rejected a decision by arbitrators to allow class 
arbitration. 252  It described class arbitration as failing to deliver attributes of 
arbitration such as “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to 
choose expert adjudicators.”253 The Court has also treated confidentiality as standard 
in arbitration settings, an attitude that may pose an obstacle to reforms relying on 
reporting requirements.254  
The saga of Supreme Court class arbitration cases may give a flavor of things to 
come. Throughout this saga, the dissenters have argued that arbitration procedure 
can or should offer the same procedures available to parties in court by allowing class 
proceedings. For instance, Justice Ginsburg analogized New York state or federal 
court and arbitration in her Stolt-Nielsen dissent.255 The majority has insisted on 
arbitration as a bargaining process that resolves disputes without formalized, 
procedural justice and maintained that class actions are inconsistent with such an 
ideal.256 Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis described “individualized” proceedings 
along with “speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness” as all among arbitration’s 
“fundamental attributes.”257  Most recently, Justice Robert’s majority opinion in 
 
 
 248. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note, (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 249. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
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 256. See id. at 685–86. 
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2019] ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL BALANCE  1485 
 
Lamps Plus v. Varela extended this analysis, suggesting that the differences between 
individual and class arbitration were reason to doubt any claims that a party 
consented to the latter.258 Roberts treated even the doctrine of contra proferentum, 
undeniably “a neutral [state law] rule,” as preempted by the FAA when a district 
court used it to order class arbitration.259 Arbitration’s basis in party consent made it 
resistant shaping through state law.260 
The majority’s suspicion of class arbitration may or may not transfer into other 
areas. Rules that make procedure more elaborate or that allow parties to halt 
proceedings to investigate an arbitrator’s conflicts of interest might interfere with 
“simplicity and inexpensiveness.” On the other hand, one might argue that such rules 
promote confidence in arbitration and that, as one state court put it, “[n]othing in the 
FAA says that an arbitration must be conducted or an arbitration award must be 
confirmed in the fastest way possible.”261 Opponents might have more difficulty 
arguing that information rules interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration. 
Data collection and reporting rules do not interfere with how arbitrations are 
conducted or change the grounds on which courts can refuse to enforce arbitral 
decisions. They may open providers and individual arbitrators to greater scrutiny, but 
claims that such scrutiny amounts to interference are both abstract and at odds with 
present practice. Arbitration providers already put awards online or send them to the 
two major reporting services. Limits on confidentiality or public access rules present 
harder cases. Significant confusion exists around the difference between confidential 
and private arbitration.262 To the extent that courts believe that confidentiality comes 
standard, they may view access to the arbitration as impermissible interference. 
However, the posture of any challenge to state law arbitration rules could make a 
difference. Along with the subject matter of the arbitration and arbitrators’ own 
actions, timing matters to the role that courts assign to arbitration. When faced with 
a motion to compel, courts are faced with arbitration as part of a contract. The 
relevant question is how much authority the parties gave to their agent, the arbitrator. 
Arbitrators are much more easily understood as third-party adjudicators when the 
question is whether to enforce an award. Then, a court may consider the sources of 
authority an arbitrator drew on and scrutinize the process in a specific arbitration. 
Some aspects of this review, such as review for excess of power, still invite the court 
to return to the contract.263 This approach would judge the fundamental attributes of 
arbitration based on its view of what the parties expected (i.e., a quicker, cheaper 
process). On the other hand, review for conflicts of interest, bias, procedural 
irregularities, and manifest disregard of law invite the court to treat arbitration like 
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litigation in court.264 This analogy might put the parties’ expectations in a different 
light and allow a view of fundamental attributes less hostile to state rules. The Court 
gives arbitrators more leeway to interpret a contract to allow class arbitration than 
they give state courts or federal regulatory agencies leeway to impose it ahead of 
time.265  
Section 2 challenges involve courts that have refused motions to compel 
arbitration, but that is not how the state rules discussed in this section would be 
implemented. They would be implemented in the first instance by arbitrators or 
provider organizations.266 A party challenging these rules in court would thus be in 
the position of arguing that the arbitrator violated the FAA and exceeded his powers 
by applying provider rules or state law. This argument would have to decouple the 
fundamental attributes test from section 2. With Stolt-Nielsen, it became evident that 
some on the Court would go so far, but the Court also stepped back from that decision 
in Oxford Health.267 
A Supreme Court that believes the FAA protects a certain ideal of arbitration as 
different from court will likely view the sorts of reforms described in Part II as a 
threat to federal law. Notwithstanding explicit reference to federal district court in 
the FAA’s provisions on award enforcement, the Court could expand them to affect 
state court too. It might also read state reforms as interfering with the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration protected by section 2 of the FAA. Preemption through either 
of these methods is a serious threat to reform. However, that threat may be reduced 
by the way state rules get enforced. Many of the state rules discussed above would 
be enforced in the first instance in the arbitration itself. Arbitrators, or the large 
arbitration providers they depend on for assignments,268 might decide that it is easier 
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to adopt state rules rather than find out which ones might become fodder for attempts 
to vacate an award. In some instances, a party might be able to go to state court to 
challenge a procedural decision by an arbitrator. 269  In other situations, the 
complaining party would have to wait until after a final decision and then decide 
whether to seek to have it vacated. Other rules, notably those that fall into the 
category of requiring information, would likely be enforced first by state regulatory 
agencies. Significant questions remain about whether FAA sections 9, 10, and 11 
would preempt state law used to vacate an award on grounds not available in the Act. 
Some of the Supreme Court’s section 2 jurisprudence might affect the willingness of 
arbitrators and judges to apply state law in, during, and after the arbitration.  
States might also take a creative approach to implementation. The private rights 
of action discussed above are one example. States could offer tax incentives to 
providers that adopted state conflicts and process rules or made case information and 
decisions public. They could also adopt a policy of preferring compliant providers 
through tax incentives or when awarding state contracts. Providers who did not get 
the tax breaks or contracts might conceivably challenge the state’s decision as 
inconsistent with federal law, but would have a harder case to make given the state 
legislature’s discretion in those areas. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF ARBITRATORS’ CASE-SPECIFIC MANDATES270 
In theory, embracing a judicial role for arbitrators and regulating accordingly 
could respond to many of the objections scholars have raised to giving arbitrators the 
power to interpret mandatory law.271 Still, a due process objection would remain. 
Arbitrators are not common law judges; they may neither create precedent, nor rely 
on previous arbitral decisions.272 Arbitrators also cannot base their decisions on 
references to public policy, for instance to fill in terms of a contract.273 This limit on 
arbitral mandates may be required to maintain democratic control over the 
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development of the law. Judges are elected or appointed through public processes 
and arbitrators are not. However, this limit on arbitral power is problematic if 
arbitrators are expected to take the place of judges in a common law system. Parties 
and arbitrators may not have enough of a system of precedent to draw on to interpret 
the law in a consistent and well-reasoned manner.  
The objection is not that arbitrators could not or would not comply with state 
requirements. Arbitrators are likely to be up to the task of complying with conflicts 
rules, enforcing procedural rules, and writing adequate awards. Arbitration 
organizations would also have incentives to make sure that arbitrators on their lists 
did so.274 Some of the same reasons judges avoid conflict with each other—such 
conflict can cost their reputations—apply to arbitrators as well.  
Cooperation, rather than conflict, is often the path of least resistance and the path 
to expanded powers for a court in a subordinate position.275 This dynamic is likely to 
hold for arbitration tribunals as well. Parties that appear in front of arbitrators are 
unlikely to urge them openly to defy state mandates. If arbitrators do so, these parties 
may find themselves in messy follow-on litigation. Parties may also fear that 
arbitrators will rule against them rather than write an award that is open to challenge 
in state court. It would be much better to show the arbitrator that she or he can rule 
for them in a manner consistent with state law. Moreover, resource-poor institutions 
can rely on the comparatively resource-rich ones to do much of the work of 
developing and defending a specific approach. “Lockstep” interpretations of state 
constitutions are one example. State courts faced with state constitutional provisions 
similar to those in the Federal Constitution often interpret them in the same manner 
as the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution. Although some have 
decried the lost opportunity for state experimentation, 276  from the state court’s 
perspective, lockstep interpretation makes sense. Unless the state court believes there 
is a strong reason the state’s approach should diverge from the federal one, relying 
on the federal approach is a useful heuristic that saves scarce judicial resources. 
Whether their awards are subjected to greater scrutiny or not, arbitrators have little 
reason to depart from a state court’s interpretation. Doing so creates more work and 
increases the possibility that the losing party will seek to have the award vacated, 
especially if the arbitrator has to provide a reasoned award. Even if arbitrators’ 
decisions were public, they cannot rely on them as precedent. Thus, arbitrators have 
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less professional incentive to depart from a state court’s approach and fewer tools 
that could back them up in doing so. 
Cooperation can also be a path to expanded powers for subordinate courts. It 
signals membership in a professional elite, as local judges seeking to establish their 
credentials can show they share the values and approaches of a respected central 
court. It also allows them to exert power over legislators, or in the case of arbitrators, 
contract drafters. Arbitrators in the types of cases that state courts have been 
concerned with are of a different professional class than those involved in 
international arbitration. 277  Yet, they too might seek the increased professional 
respect that comes with deploying greater technical skill to comply with state law or 
issue reasoned, public decisions.278 
More complex state rules favor organizations that can put in place procedures to 
follow the rules. Complexity also favors the appointment of lawyers as arbitrators, 
favors repeat arbitrators, and potentially increases their professional prestige. 
Adopting the approach to state law advocated by state courts is also the easiest choice 
for an arbitrator to make. Otherwise, the arbitrator must explain why a different 
approach is warranted on pain of having the award vacated. Having awards one has 
rendered vacated is a highly visible signal, because it happens in court, and is 
probably bad for business. If the issue involves a potential conflict between federal 
and state law, the cautious arbitrator would have more reason to side with state courts 
in states with more searching standards of review than with federal courts likely to 
accept any sufficiently motivated decision. If there are instances of noncooperation, 
as with incomplete statistical reporting, state legislators will have to decide how 
coercive they want to be in response. That legislators have been relatively restrained 
thus far should not be confused for an absence of power.  
Arbitrators in some domestic settings might be analogous to state judges in first 
instance courts. In consumer and employment arbitration, arbitrators are often 
lawyers with experience resembling that of a state judge.279 AAA requires that its 
arbitrators in certain areas be retired judges, academics, or lawyers with significant 
practice experience. 280  JAMS suggests that the parties specify similar levels of 
 
 
 277. See Weidemaier, supra note 101, at 83–84 (observing that domestic bilateral 
arbitrations might not offer enough returns to draw expert lawyers or arbitrators); accord 
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 109, at 124–25 (“Domestic arbitration . . . is much closer to 
the pole of business than to that of law.”).  
 278. Weidemaier, supra note 198, at 1919 (“[A]rbitrators often operate in a competitive 
market in which future purchasers will choose an arbitrator based on perceptions about the 
arbitrator’s diligence, expertise, and impartiality.”). 
 279. See Cole, supra note 196, at 876 (“[T]he vast majority of commercial, employment, 
and consumer arbitrators are legally trained and typically have fifteen or more years of legal 
practice in the area in which they specialize.”). 
 280. Qualification Criteria and Responsibilities for Members of the AAA Panel of 
Construction Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASSOC., https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files 
/document_repository/Qualification%20Criteria%20and%20Responsibilites%20for%20Me
mbers%20of%20the%20AAA%20Panel%20of%20Construction%20Arbitrators.pdf [https:// 
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experience.281 Arbitrators might be expected to be able to use the same level of skill 
in managing the arbitral process and in writing their awards as state judges use in 
managing the trial process and writing their opinions and orders. Moreover, if states 
make greater procedural demands or enforce transparency rules, arbitration providers 
may alter their lists to include different sorts of arbitrators. 
Some organizations already provide more transparency and process protections 
than the law requires. They assert that they are doing so because of their view of what 
their professional role should be.282 Several providers have adopted due process 
protocols, the oldest of which is the Employment Due Process Protocol, adopted in 
1995.283 It was the work of an American Bar Association taskforce, which included 
AAA, the ACLU, and the National Employment Lawyers Association, as well as 
several organizations representing professional arbitrators. 284  In developing its 
Consumer Due Process Protocol two years later, AAA convened an advisory 
commission with consumer and seller representatives, state and federal agencies, and 
academics.285 AAA’s Health Care Protocol followed a similar process.286 Today, 
AAA and JAMS have similar consumer and employment rules. Two other large 
providers claim that they meet a similar standard.287 Providers were driven to adopt 
the protocols specifically because they were being asked to step into a role closer to 
that of judging by deciding statutory claims. 288  The processes of convening 
stakeholders and adopting a consensus report certainly resembles the sort of 
rulemaking a public adjudicator might undertake. However, the arbitration 
providers’ compliance with their own rules is not subject to outside monitoring.289 
This lack of monitoring represents a limit to the extent providers see themselves as 
taking on the same roles and responsibilities as judicial administrative offices. Other 
providers, sometimes even other parts of the same organization, may not even make 
a pretense of meeting internal or external standards.  
The problem is thus not that arbitrators cannot or will not cooperate. The problem 
is rather that, in the Supreme Court’s conception, arbitrators exceed their powers 
 
 
 281. JUDICIAL ARB. & MEDIATION SERVS., INC., JAMS CLAUSE WORKBOOK (2018).  
 282. For instance, AAA provides online, searchable class arbitration case dockets. It does 
so in part because of concerns about whether the parties and the public will view class 
arbitration outcomes as legitimate. Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309. In another very different example, Wikipedia 
has a detailed arbitration process to resolve disputes among editors culminating in public, 
reasoned awards. Wikipedia: Dispute Resolution, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution [https://perma.cc/3V8E-6UKU]. 
 283. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 369, 369 (2004). 
 284. Id. at 390. 
 285. Id. at 405. 
 286. Id. at 407. 
 287. Id. at 404 n.196. 
 288. See id. at 382–84. One of the principal architects of the employment rules, the then 
president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, expressed the view that due process rules 
were needed because arbitration was supposed to substitute for judicial and administrative 
adjudication. Id. at 395. 
 289. Id. at 427. 
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when they relate to the law as judges do. Dicta in Stolt-Nielsen suggests that tribunals 
that act as “common-law court[s]” and base their decisions on what other arbitrators 
have done or on public policy will see their awards vacated.290 The more that a 
combination of federal and state legislation puts arbitrators in the position of 
performing a judicial role, the greater the tension with the limits on the reasons they 
can give for their decisions. 
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that an arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers by 
ordering class arbitration when the parties had not agreed to class procedures.291 The 
case itself involved antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, which are often brought 
in court on a class basis because of the expense involved in proving them.292 Given 
the nature of the case and the statutory rights at stake, the tribunal had decided that 
public policy dictated that class proceedings be allowed, citing several similar prior 
arbitrations.293 In deciding that the tribunal exceeded its powers, the majority relied 
on the slippage between contract and adjudication. The arbitrators were not judges 
and therefore could not develop their own rules, but their role was judicial enough 
that it demanded fidelity to the law and the contract as written, rather than 
freewheeling gap filling.294 
The Justices’ fear of arbitral precedent might be well-founded. The international 
commercial arbitrators in Stolt-Nielsen were appointed by the parties to resolve one 
dispute. U.S. judges are either elected or appointed through public vetting processes 
that, ideally, serve to justify their authority. They will resolve many disputes and 
might be expected to have some investment in the judiciary as an institution. If 
arbitrators began to spin off their own interpretations of statutes, and apply them in 
future cases, they would lack such a public mandate.295 The argument that arbitrators 
have done just that in the international investment arena has led to calls to end its 
use.296  
Domestic arbitral tribunals might have a more modest view of their own role. 
Although some cited the decisions of previous tribunals as persuasive authority, the 
arbitrators Mark Weidemaier studied relied only on relevant statutes and case law as 
 
 
  290. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). Some 
conservatives on the Court were skeptical of such approaches generally. Antonin Scalia argued 
that judges should abandon what he saw as an overly pragmatic “common-law” approach in 
favor of one he saw as more bound by statutory text. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in 
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution 
and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 12–14 (1997).  
 291. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684. 
 292. See id. at 689 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 293. Id. at 675. 
 294. See id. at 674–75. 
 295. The Court has taken this view in contexts beyond the facts of Stolt-Nielsen. See 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 263 (2009) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36 (1974)); MacDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285, 290 (1984); 
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Syst., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 729–30, 744 (1981). 
 296. See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473–76 (2009) 
(describing critiques of investment arbitration); Weidemaier, supra note 198, at 1956–57 
(raising questions about the development of precedent in arbitration and comparing domestic 
systems with investor state arbitration). 
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controlling.297 Arbitral precedent has since become more problematic. As discussed 
above, AAA arbitral tribunals have diverged markedly from federal courts in their 
view of the law of class arbitration.298 That divergence comes from the decisions of 
arbitrators who have greater experience with class arbitration and seem to be more 
comfortable ordering it despite the Supreme Court’s warnings.299 The experienced 
arbitrators may be following approaches from their previous (uncited) opinions. 
Common law judging is not the only way for adjudicators to make and to explain 
decisions recognized as legitimate in their legal systems. In the French legal tradition, 
for instance, judges issue short, syllogistic opinions. To do otherwise would be 
considered an affront to the proper judicial role. 300  Lawyers look to additional 
sources, such as semiofficial case commentary. Courts in other traditions also relate 
to previous decisions in a way that deviates from the way common law courts relate 
to precedent.301 The difficulty is that, outside certain exceptions, the American legal 
system assumes a certain type of adjudicator. This adjudicator is expected to invoke 
precedent, including persuasive precedents from the same court, and public policy in 
making decisions. If arbitrators cannot use their own precedents or refer to public 
policy as the basis for their decisions, then argument about legal issues in arbitration 
cannot take place on the terms it does in court.  
Procedural changes and reporting of arbitral awards, elements that make 
arbitration more courtlike, might encourage parties and their lawyers to treat 
arbitration like court. Particularly in areas in which arbitration is common and 
judicial precedents correspondingly scarce, the temptation will be to rely on previous 
arbitral decisions. If arguments do revert to familiar forms, then arbitrators may not 
be able to be honest about having relied on them to come to a decision. Asking 
lawyers to put aside a portion of their training in arriving at a decision about a legal 
issue in a case may be hard; asking them to omit an explanation is easier. Even when 
arbitration clauses are written with broad and vague strokes, arbitrators may believe 
themselves compelled to argue that their decisions come from the clauses 
themselves.302 They may be encouraged to make large leaps of logic in contract 
interpretation for want of other tools.303  
There are thus two dangers to asking those involved in an arbitration to set aside 
the normal order of things from litigation in court. If parties are not able to do so, and 
arbitrators are, the parties’ arguments will not form the basis for the arbitrator’s 
decision. The other danger is that the parties will set aside references to prior 
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2019] ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL BALANCE  1493 
 
arbitrations, but arbitrators will not. These prior arbitrations will then have a 
significant but unspoken influence on the outcome. As a result, the parties will not 
have truly participated in the arbitration.304 They will have been treated with bad 
faith—offered what they believed was a chance to influence the decision, but in fact 
denied that opportunity.305 
Although these scenarios are possible with any adjudicator, Stolt-Nielsen’s 
demand that arbitrators not be common law judges, combined with the training many 
received as common law lawyers, may make it more likely with arbitration. One-
shot players, such as the consumers and employees, may face special disadvantages 
in a system that is more alien than they realize. Moreover, the low standard of review 
for arbitral awards means that parties are unlikely to successfully challenge decisions 
that depart from longstanding interpretations of the law or of similar contracts.306 
When parties have tried to rely on previous arbitral decisions to prove manifest 
disregard of law, courts have rebuffed them.307  
A third version of the scenario I contemplate is that third parties may not be able 
to discern what is going on. The parties and arbitrator may understand each other, 
and the decision not reflect that understanding. This situation would not necessarily 
present the same due process problem. 308  However, it would create significant 
problems for state legislatures as they would not necessarily be able to determine the 
state of the law or predict the effect of any change to it. 
State legislatures, arbitration providers, and individual arbitrators can act in ways 
that account for a line between arbitration and court. The difficulty will be to ensure 
adequate vigilance and specificity on the part of state legislatures and courts if they 
cannot rely on arbitrators to develop the law on their own.309 Legislatures might have 
to be prepared to create more detailed statutes and update them more often. 
Arbitrators might want to explicitly avoid writing in the style of common law courts. 
Restrictive reporting might also be useful. A public entity, perhaps even a part of the 
state court system, that vetted awards might do much to alleviate the danger of hidden 
persuasive precedent that does not reflect the views of public bodies like the 
legislature or the courts (assuming those views are somewhat congruent). 
Legislatures might repeat the rule that arbitral decisions are not precedent in any 
statute requiring reporting.  
Courts may also approach commonly arbitrated statutes from the point of view 
that common law judges will not be applying them. In departing from the idea that 
the statutes are codes that will seldom be elaborated by judicial decision, legislatures 
may need to offer more details and more frequent updates. If a given decision will 
be the only precedent the parties can refer to for a very long time, a judge may need 
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to offer more detailed and encompassing holdings. Doing so goes against the typical 
rule that the judge should decide only what is necessary to resolve the case. That rule, 
however, assumes a common law system, with common law judges building on the 
precedent.  
The state reform proposals outlined above bring arbitration closer to judging, but 
they do not and cannot go all the way there. Arbitrators, unlike common law judges, 
cannot create precedent or respond to arguments from public policy. The danger is 
that the parties, faced with a figure very similar to a judge, will expect arbitrators to 
have these interpretive tools. Along with parties and their lawyers, state legal systems 
will also have to adapt to arbitration’s limits, even if arbitral process and transparency 
is improved. State lawmakers who seek greater control of arbitration may find that 
the choices arbitrators make may influence their own decisions and those of state 
judges. Some of the proposals above would give arbitrators unprecedented access to 
means with which to influence state law, such as issuing public, reasoned decisions. 
That influence should be limited by an awareness of the nature of arbitrators’ 
mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has paired a broad view of arbitral power with decisions that 
prevent state courts from enforcing state laws by refusing to allow arbitration in most 
cases. In response to this situation, state courts may find it congenial to expand 
arbitral power as well. Doing so at least avoids more negative federal precedent. 
Meanwhile, some state legislatures, academics, and advocates have sought to make 
arbitration more like judging. Proposed and enacted rules that fit this mold aim to 
ensure arbitrator independence, minimal standards of process, and adequate 
information about what arbitrators decide. One of the paradoxes of privatization is 
that as the private has colonized the public space of courts, public regulation may 
enter the private space of arbitration. 
If state rules regulating what happens during and after arbitration are applied in 
the first instance in arbitration or are used to vacate awards, these reforms stand a 
better chance of surviving preemption than rules applied to refuse arbitration to begin 
with. However, state lawmakers are not entirely in the clear. The Supreme Court has 
sometimes seemed to define the fundamental attributes of arbitration as being the 
opposite of litigation in court. When state rules suggest a similarity between 
arbitration and court, the Court may object that they are inappropriate.  
Even if an arbitration meets standards of due process in every other respect, the 
problem of what reasons an arbitrator may give for their decision would remain. An 
arbitration tribunal is not a common law court but is supposed to adjudicate statutory 
rights of vulnerable parties in a common law legal system. The danger is that 
arbitrations that resemble court proceedings and resolve the types of questions 
resolved in court in fact either resolve them on a different basis or pretend to. The 
matters that arbitral tribunals are permitted to decide are at odds both with lax 
procedural controls and with the reasons tribunals are permitted to give. Other 
solutions, such as amending the Federal Arbitration Act, are surely more 
straightforward than adapting to a situation in which disputes can move out of and 
into a common law system. Still, state legislatures that pay attention to arbitration’s 
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specificities may succeed in developing a system that provides significantly better 
process than what is on offer today. 
Fully enacting this approach requires a new view of arbitrators that treats 
arbitration as somewhere between the public and private spheres rather than as purely 
private. It thus raises at the domestic level questions scholars of international and 
comparative law have been raising with respect to public and private international 
legal orders. Domestically, as well as internationally, “law-making is happening 
alongside the state.”310 Yet the state “is still a central player, its centrality lying in the 
way the state organizes its own decentering.” 311  State governments can play a 
constructive role in this process, challenging federal assumptions and developing a 
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